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Article 1

Property as the Keystone Right?
CarolM. Rose*
The collapse of socialist regimes has revived an interest in property
rights all over the world, as once-statist nations consider privatization as a
route to commercial and economic revitalization.' Even here in the property-conscious United States, constitutional property rights have become a
2
subject of renewed popular and political interest.
But property rights have a somewhat uneasy place in a constitutional
ordering. There are of course substantial libertarian arguments for property rights as an element of personal autonomy,3 but on the whole, the
post-socialist enthusiasm for property seems to have been overwhelmingly
economic: the allure of property is that it enhances wealth, both personal
Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Yale law School.
For many helpful comments I would especially like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Jane Baron,
Jack Balkin, Fred Bosselman, Peter Byrne,James Krier, and Laura Underkuffler. I would also like
to thank the participants in workshops at the Georgetown University law School and Yale law
School, as well as the participants in the Fourth International Conference on Social Justice in
Trier, Germany, and the Conference of International Property Lawyers in Maastricht, The
Netherlands. A very early foray into some of the thoughts expressed here appeared in my review
*

of JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GuARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT. A CONSTITUTIoNAL HISTORY OF

PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992), in 10 CONST. CoMMENTARY 238 (1993).
1 Amy Chua, The Pfivatization-NationalizationCycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in
Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995) (describing recent interest in privatization).
Chua goes on to argue, however, that enthusiasm for privatization historically has see-sawed with
enthusiasm for nationalization. I&. at 224-25.
2 For the emergence of the property rights movement in the United States, see, e.g., Christopher Georges, Wuer Property-OwnerCompensation May Prove a Costly Clause in the "Contract With
America" WALL ST.J., Dec. 30, 1994, atA8; H.Jane Lehman, Owners Aren't Giving Ground in Property Battles (First in three-part series, Whose LandIs It?, on the private-property rights movement in
the United States), CHI. TRiB., Feb. 9, 1992, Real Estate §, at 1. As of the fall of 1994, all state
legislatures had considered, and ten had enacted, some version of legislation to restrain governmental "takings" of private property. See Robert H. Freilich & RoxAnne Doyle, Taking Legislation:
Misguided and Dangerous,LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1994, at 3. The Congress elected in
1994 has also considered takings legislation. The House passed the Private Property Protection
Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), on March 3, 1995, while the Senate considered several bills during 1995, most notably the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
3 Even libertarians sometimes cite economic arguments. A very important book in the development of the American property rights movement is RcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN (1985), which thoroughly intermixes libertarian
and economic rationales. Compare iaL at 3-6 (utilitarian/economic considerations) with id. at 12
(natural rights).
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and social. Constitutions, on the other hand, are concerned classically and
fundamentally with political ordering. While property is often included
among constitutionally protected rights,4 it seems less central to the political core of constitutional government than the rights most critical to selfgovernance-primarily voting, speech, and assembly. On the other hand,
property's central role in economic (or "merely economic") ordering would
seem to be peripheral to the political order, or to the individual rights that
support democratic governance.
One of the classic property theorists was Jeremy Bentham, and it is
easy to extract from his work the idea that property serves essentially economic ends rather than political ones. Bentham argued powerfully for the
economic benefits of property, but he regarded property not as a right but
as a creature of law, and indeed as "nothing but a basis of expectation." 5
The security of property is vitally important, he said, not because property
is a right with a political role, but because a society that safeguards property
is wealthy.6 Being wealthy, that society can satisfy more individual preferences than a society in which property is at risk (and hence poor).
Bentham is one of many authors who have contributed to a very standard story about property as a wealth-creating institution. The point of
origin is John Locke's observation that resources only become valuable if
people work on developing them. 7 But people will not work much without
some inducement, and if there is no such inducement to labor, resources
lie undeveloped and total wealth remains low. 8
What induces people to labor? Property does. Let people have secure
property, and they will learn to invest their labor on the things that they
own, because they themselves will take the rewards. 9 They will plan carefully and prudently, because if they do not, they will bear the losses. Moreover, they will organize trades, because property is a signalling device,
telling everyone which things belong to whom and allowing people to bargain with one another instead ofjust taking things or (worse yet, and even
4 The original United States Constitution had no specific protection of property; the closest
provision was the Contracts Clause, prohibiting the states from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Of course, the original document also had no reference to
many other rights, including speech and assembly. Takings of property for public use and without due process of law were prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, passed as part of the Bill of
Rights. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111 (C.K.
Ogden ed., 1931) [hereinafter Civil Code]. Bentham had little use for the notion of natural rights
of any sort. SeeJEEMv BETHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES; BEING AN EXAMINATION OF THE DECLARATIONS OF RIGHTS ISSUED DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,

reprinted in 2

THE WORKS OF JEREMY

489, 501 (john Bowring ed., 1843) (arguing that natural rights are "simple nonsense,"
.natural and imprescriptible rights" are "nonsense upon stilts").
6 Civil Code, supra note 5, at 113-14.
7 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, THE SECOND TREATISE, §§ 40-43, 338-40 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963) (1st ed. 1960) (arguing that most of the value of goods is due to labor).
8 Md§ 41, at 338-39 (making an unflattering comparison to the poverty of North American
Indians, whose resources are less valuable because less labor is invested); see also Civil Code, supra
note 5, at 118-19 (making similar observations).
9 Civil Code, supranote 5, at 112, 114. One of the few challenges to this standard story is by
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and ContractEfficient , 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 711,
744, 749 (1980) (arguing that the incentive effects of various property and contract rules cannot
be known without empirical investigation).
BENTHAM
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more wasteful) fighting over them. 10 Once able to trade, they will invest
even more in socially useful activities, because the whole world becomes
the market for their efforts." Finally, they will monitor the behavior of
others, because if others transgress, they themselves will lose the fruits of
their investment, prudence, and planning; thus to a considerable degree, a
property regime enlists the self-interest of individuals to become a self-po2
licing system.'
By way of contrast, when ownership is insecure, we see something like
the turmoil of recent Russia or indeed of any place undergoing social
revolution. Investment and effort in trade or business may be dampened
when "Mafia" thugs threaten the successful, or when vaguely-authorized officials siphon off the fruits of one's efforts.' 3 Valuable natural resourcesforests, fisheries, minerals, waters-may be treated as unmanaged commons, where everyone takes and no one replenishes and the resources
themselves dwindle to nothing.' 4 And. indeed, the gains of the toughest
takers dwindle too, since they may dissipate their proceeds in an effort to
guard them from everyone else. The lesson is clear: we are better off with
secure property rights, which induce us to invest, trade, and gently monitor
each other in ways that make us all better off.
But suppose all this is true: from the perspective of constitutional ordering, the obvious question is, "So what?" Even supposing that the security of property brings greater wealth, why should a constitution aim at
wealth? Should it not rather aim at orderly processes of governance and
the individual rights that support those processes? Our own constitution
protects property and commerce, but to what end? As Patrick Henry thunderously complained during the ratification debates: 'You are not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor how you are to become a great

10 2 WiLuIAM BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *5 (stating that property
rights are necessary to avoid the "innumerable tumults" of many persons striving to get the same
thing); Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundationfor Exchange, 14 J. LEcAL STUD. 321, 322-26
(1985) (asserting that clearly defined property facilitates exchange).
11 LocKE, supra note 7, §§ 48-49, at 343 (stating that the availability of trade and money
makes cultivation attractive and resources more valuable).
12 SeeRobert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327-28 (1993) (discussing the
advantages and incentives for monitoring on individual landed property). Even much more complex property-like regimes encourage monitoring by rights-holders; see, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 171, 183 (1988) (arguing that the holders of tradeable emission rights will
support monitoring and enforcement).
13 See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, In Russia, Success Isn't Such a PopularIdea, N.Y. TiXsS, Mar. 12,
1995, § 4, at 1 (reporting that successful business people fear assassination); Adi Ignatius, Raw
Capitalism: Moscow Street Entrepreneurs in Street Kiosks Point Way to New Economy, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 1992, at Al (reporting on hard-driving trader's success in semi-underworld dealings, but including a discussion of the need to pay petty bribes and fear about long-term economic order).
See generally STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRuMINAL: RussrA's NEW MAFYA (1995) (describing

the extensive reach of criminal activity in Russia, both by "Mafiya" and former Soviet officials).
For the depressing effect on free enterprise, see, for example, id. at 158-60.
14 See, e.g., Michael Specter, SiberiaAwaits the Onslaught, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 4, 1994, § 4, at 1, 4
(describing uncontrolled and environmentally damaging forest cutting, mining, pollution, and
fish and wildlife destruction in Siberia).
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and powerful people, but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty
ought to be the direct end of your government."' 5
Other doubts about property are raised in the double standard of
rights introduced by the notorious footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products, according to which "mere" economic rights like property take a
constitutional back seat to the rights associated with political participation
or the avoidance of majoritarian oppression. 16 And a modem commentator on constitutional property, Jennifer Nedelsky, argues that the security
of property may be as much a hindrance as a help in securing individual
rights-particularly when individual rights are understood in the light of
7
an egalitarian vision of constitutionalism.1
How different from these slights to property, then, are the startlingly
bold observations of Adam Smith, not on the mere importance of property
as a political matter, but on its centrality to governance. Here are his words
in his Lectures onJurisprudence,given in the 1760s, and somewhat unartfully
passed on to us through his note-takers:
The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the members of a society from incroaching [sic]
on one anothers [sic] property, or siezing [sic] what is not their own.
The design here is to give each one the secure and peacable [sic] possession of his own property. The end proposed by justice is the maintaining
[of] men in what are called their perfect rights.' 8
Each of these three sentences essentially repeats the same message:
three times over, Smith tells us that justice means protecting people in
what is theirs. Note that this is not simply an object of government, but
rather "the first and chief' one-a sort of Benthamite program for the security of property, but with the name 'Justice" tacked on. 19
An even more pointed comment on property's centrality was made by
an American contemporary of Smith's, Arthur Lee, according to whom
property is "the guardian of every other right."20 A modem legal historian,
15

3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-

TUTION

16

44-45 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (remarks of Patrick Henry (VA)).

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

17 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMrrs OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THE MADISONLAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 261-62 (1990); see also id. at 318, n.43 (noting the

conflict between new statutorily created rights and property rights). Nedelsky to some degree
spells out some constitutional implications of John Rawls' jurisprudence. See id. at 317, n.39
(describing Rawls as "the best known of the egalitarian theorists"); see a/sOJOHN RAwLS, A THEORY
OFJUSTICE 72-76, 78, 83 (1971) (describing features of the "difference principle," which requires
that increases in the well-being of the better-off must also increase the well-being of the worseoff); cf ROBERT NozIcir, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 150-53, 195-96, 201-03, 207 (1974) (arguing
that no one should be deprived of property rights justly acquired orjustly transferred, and that
this principle is incompatible with Rawls' theory).
18 ADAM SMrrH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978). Smith later
explained that "perfect rights" are those that may be compelled by force. Id. at 326-27.
19 Smith went on to say that the next object of government was "promoting the opulence of
the state"; this suggests that protecting property was different from (though clearly compatible
with) promoting prosperity. SMrrH, supra note 18, at 5. Bentham also remarked that the legislator should protect the security of property "under the name ofjustice" Civil Code, supranote 5, at
119.
20 ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THEJUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN
THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (New York, Rivington, 4th ed. 1775), quoted inJAMES W.
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James Ely, has titled his history of property with Lee's line, and he has used
it to argue that property rights are equal in status to all other constitutional
21
rights.
To be sure, property may be an important right, but what is most interesting in Smith's and Lee's remarks is a much headier suggestion: that
property rights are not simply equally important to other rights, but are the
most important of all rights. Their remarks locate property as the linchpin,
the pivot, the central right on which all the others turn, the "guardian of
every other right."
As it turns out, this quite remarkable claim has had a number of permutations, old and new. All of them clearly look to property to do considerably more for a constitutional order than "merely" to secure economic
prosperity. My purpose in this paper is to explore seven of those permutations, along with the caveats and critiques that they raise-caveats and critiques that at a minimum leave the political implications of property rights
in an ambiguous state, though not without considerable residual force. Beneath the ambiguity, and complementing its "merely" economic role, I will
conclude that property's most serious politicalclaim is as an almost invisible
educational institution.
There are many reasons why one might say that property is an important right. But why would anyone say that property is the keystone right,
the central ight on which all others rest? Here are seven answers.
I.

THE PRioRiTY ARGUMENT

Property is the key to all otherrights because it is priorto politics, and hence
the basis upon which all other civil rights rest.
The Priority Argument is undoubtedly the most familiar of all. It is
usually associated with John Locke's social contract theory, a theory in
which property plays an extremely important role. Locke's story is what
might be called a "bottom-up" or "from below" theory of property: people
begin by the most primitive appropriation, that is, literally consuming the
nuts and berries and other natural foodstuffs around them. 22 Then they
take this primitive appropriation a step further, collecting and storing a few
non-perishable items that make them better off-nuts again, perhaps some
animal skins, and finally little bits of metal that they trade around among
themselves. 23 To protect these acquisitions, they may use self-help, but
given the "inconveniencies" of that enforcement method, they ultimately
safeguard for the
institute government to provide a more comprehensive
24
property they have acquired through their efforts.
ELY,JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

26 (1992).
21 ELY, supra note 20, at 134.

22

LocKE, supra note 7, § 28, at 39-30.

23
24

Id §§ 46-47, at 342-43.
Me §§ 123-31, at 395-99.
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There are modem versions of this story, and they are told especially by
people interested in studies sometimes called the "new institutionalism" or
"new institutional economics." 2 5 Elinor Ostrom, for example, describes a
number of situations that have a general resemblance to the Lockean story:
in her depictions, people are intelligent and inventive; they poke around in
their surroundings and often figure out how to manage the raw materials
of nature in informal ways-for example, ways to fish in a Sri Lankan village, irrigate in a Spanish community, or graze livestock in a Swiss orJapanese mountain area.26 The people in these communities can make
themselves better off by inventing property regimes for allocating the fishing or hunting spots, grazing rights, irrigation duties, or whatever. They
manage to run things for themselves in a way that preserves the underlying
resources and prevents outsiders from poaching and insiders from shirking
or overreaching. When these common enterprises become big or complex
enough, they may call on governments for more formal policing and
27
enforcement.
On the other hand, in these "new institutional" stories, government
may be just a waste and a nuisance. Ostrom and others give many examples of scenarios in which formal state officialdom badly disrupts the perfectly satisfactory informal property regimes that people set up for
themselves. The formal governance structures may allow too many outsiders to get their hands on the fishing ground or community forest or other
resource, turning a managed common property into an open access regime. 28 That move in turn leads to the ruination of the underlying resource, reenacting the tragedy of the commons in which everyone tries to
take as much as possible, knowing that conservation is for naught.
Notice that in these scenarios, the wealth-producing success of the informal property regime is a kind of yardstick by which to criticize the performance of formal government. That is, in these modern stories,
preservation of the pre-political property of the people is the measure of
29
the goodness or badness of the state.
Thus, in the modern common-property-regime literature, property
starts from just plain folks, and from their activities in appropriating the
natural resources around them. Were it not for their efforts to create prop25 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTrVE ACTION 22-23 (1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessonsform the Ra-

tional Choice Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 131 (1989).
26 OSTROM, supra note 25, at 61-69 (describing Swiss andJapanese communities' longstanding grazing institutions); id. at 69-82 (Spanish irrigation communities); id at 149-57 (Sri Lankan
fishing community).
27 James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and EcologicalEffects of Territorialityin
Maine Lobster Fishing, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, 37, 50 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M.
Acheson eds., 1987) (describing a lobstering community that is successful with informal norms
but that persuades the state to take on some enforcement).

28 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 25, at 154-57 (explaining how government intervention undermines local self-government of fishery); Evelyn Pinkerton, Intercepting the State: Dramatic
Processes in the Assertion of Local Comanagement Rights, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra
note 27, at 344, 359-63 (giving examples of governmental policies encouraging local overfishing).
29 See also Douglas Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 367,
383 (1991) (arguing that natural rights tradition foresees prevention of harms to property as
governmental function).
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erty from raw nature, there would be no reason for government, or for the
preservation of the political regime. That is the modern version of the
bottom-up story of property, and it is not really all that different from the
Lockean bottom-up story.
But now, let us take another look at Locke. Locke actually alluded to a
second property story too, but it was a top-down story. In the telling, it was
much more muted than his bottom-up story, but his top-down story was
considerably more influential in practice.
Locke's top-down story of property (like his bottom-up story) was related to the soon-to-be standard economic argument that the security of
property enhances total social wealth. But Locke took the story a further
step: he hinted -thatthis extra social wealth could be quite useful to rulers.
Extra wealth meant bigger tax coffers, something quite attractive to monarchic governments whose military escapades meant that they frequently
flirted with insolvency. But as Locke remarked in the middle of his discussion of property, "[T]hat Prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by
established laws of liberty to secure protection and incouragement [sic] to
the honest industry of Mankind . ... will quickly be too hard for his
neighbours."30 Much the same idea was to be expressed by the Physiocratic
thinker Francis Quesnay a few decades later, when he pointed out that "it is
earnings and expenditures of the subjects that creates the sovereign's
revenues."3 '
And those eighteenth century sovereigns heard the message, particularly the. "enlightened despots" on the Continent-not just the French
kings but also the Empress Catherine the Great of Russia; the Hapsburg
Empress Maria Theresa and her son the EmperorJoseph II, who ruled not
only Austria but also Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the East and Belgium
in the West; Kings Frederick William I and his son Frederick II (The Great)
of Prussia, whose rule stretched from central Germany out to what is now
Poland as well as to a string of principalities along the Rhine; the rulers of
Denmark, Portugal, Saxony, Wfirttemberg, Baden, and raft of smaller
principalities through northern, central and southern Europe. 32 In those
countries, unlike the more pluralist and gradually changing England, ecoit was
nomic policy was a matter of conscious legislation and decree, and
33
there that the actions of the "godlike princes" were most obvious.
Despite a continuing pattern of mercantilist control, many of these
rulers instituted some mix of measures to promote commerce and to permit property to be freely earned and traded, without regard to status or
30 LOCKE, supranote 7, § 42, at 340 (emphasis added).
Quoted in Betty Behrens, Government and Society, in 5 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
613 (E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson
eds., 1977) (translation mine). Behrens also notes that the Physiocratic doctrine was most appealing to the governments that were in the greatest financial difficulties.
32 For an overview of the major figures, see JOHN G. GAGLIARDo, ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM 2836 (1967).
33 LEONARD KRIEGER, KINGS AND PHILOSOPHERS, 1689-1789, at 135 (1970) (observing that
31

EUROPE: THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF EARLY MODERN EUROPE

while the scope of economic liberty in Continental principalities was narrower than in Britain,
liberalization there was more noticeably marked by explicit legislation).
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birth. 34 That meant authorizing factory production to operate outside
town walls, free from the constraints of guild rules.3 5 It meant relaxing

some of the aggravating remnants of feudal service that complicated the
lives of rural peasants, and restructuring some land tenures to permit individual enterprise.3 6 It meant opening up previously closed businesses to
37
Jews and other upstarts.
Such measures were political, in a dual sense: the so-called enlightened monarchs hoped that more and freer commerce would lead to more
taxable wealth, of course, to be tapped for their own treasuries.38 But freeing property and commerce could have another political consequence as
well: it could loosen the economic stranglehold of the vast array of privileged groups, including the guilds and other urban elites of the towns, the
aristocrats in the countryside, and the various elite families with longstanding monopoly franchises on particular businesses. 39 As a planned or unplanned side effect, the rulers' economic measures opened up trade and
manufacture and even land ownership to a minor gaggle of upstarts and
incipient capitalists, traders and factory owners, some of whom got mixed
up in politics. 40 As such, liberalizing economic reform was part of a larger
34 GAGLIARDO, supra note 32, at 36-43; KRIEGER, supra note 33, at 131-36, 301-04. With respect to the Hapsburg monarchs, John Komlos has argued that mercantilist theory became less
influential over time, being increasingly supplanted by free-market ideas; seeJohn Komlos, Institutional Change Under Pressure: Enlightened Government Policy in the Eighteenth-CenturyHabsburgMonarchy, 15J. EUR. ECON. Hisr. 427, 431-34, 457-58 (1986); see also Gustav Otruba, Die Wrtschaftspolitik

Maria Theresias undJosephs I, in VON DER GLCiCKSELIGKEIT DES STAATEs: STAAT, WIRTSCHAFr LIND
GESELLSCHAFT IN OSTERREITCH IM ZErrALTER DES AUFGEKLARTEN ABSOLUTISMUS 77-78 (Herbert
Matis ed., 1981) (distinguishing an earlier and later mercantilism, with the latter much more
influenced by the ideas of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith).
35 GAGLIARDO, supra note 32, at 37. For France, see Hilton L. Root, Privilege and the Regulation of the Eighteenth-Centuy French Trades, 20 J. EUR. ECON. Hisr. 301, 329-31, 333-34 (1991) (explaining that primarily for fiscal reasons, the crown first tolerated deviance from guild rules, then
attempted to abolish guilds). For Germany, see MACK WALKER, GERMAN HoME TowNs: COMMUNITY, STATE AND GENERAL ESTATE, 1648-1871, at 120-22, 125-26 (1971) (describing guild conflicts
with larger non-guild merchants and bureaucrats' favoritism to latter). For the Hapsburg possessions, see Komlos, supra note 34, at 442-45; Otruba, supra note 34, at 89-90 (describing Maria
Theresa's and Joseph II's relaxation of guild restrictions).
36 GAGLIARDO, supranote 32, at 39-40, 58-59; Komlos, supra note 34, at 437-42, 445-46. Even
in Russia, where peasants were the most unfree, Catherine the Great made some effort to open
up economic opportunity; see KRMEGER, supra note 33, at 300-01.
37 Komlos, supra note 34, at 460-62 (noting the existence of greater commercial opportunities for Jews in Hapsburg possessions, though real estate was more restricted); Root, supra note
35, at 340 (noting that French guilds opened to Jews after 1776, over protest of the existing
members).

38

GAGLIARDO, supra note 32, at 44-45, 66.

39 For the general system of privilege, see C. B. BEHRENs, THE ANCIENT REGIME 52-62, 177-80
(1967). See also HANs ROSENBERG, BuREAucitAcY, ARISTOCRACY AND AUTOcRAcaY THE PRUSSIAN
EXPERIENCE, 1660-1815, at 80 (1958) (describing aristocratic families' monopolies over various
economic enterprises, particularly mining and metallurgy); WALKER, supra note 35, at 77-78, 86-87
(describing seventeenth and eighteenth century German urban elites' legal monopolies over various economic enterprises and conflicts with outside commercial interests).
40 One of the most spectacular examples was Joseph Sfiss Oppenheimer, commonly known
asJud Sfiss, a member of a HeidelbergJewish trading family; in the 1730s he became chief financial adviser to the Duke of Wfirttemberg, where he tried to reorganize and centralize finances.
His efforts outraged the local notables, and after his patron the Duke died suddenly, Sfss was
tried and executed for various misdeeds. For a capsule history, including some of the literary
treatments of his life, see Martarita Pazi,Jud Siss-Geschichte und LiterarischesBild, 118 LITERATUR
UND KRITIK 480 (Sept. 1977); for a full biography, see SELMA STERN, JUD Sfiss, EIN BEITRAG ZUR
DEUTSCHEN UND ZUR JUDISCHEN GESCHICHTE (1929). Sfiss also became the subject of a virulently
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effort to cabin and rationalize the crazy-quilt privileges of the established
"constituted bodies," so central in the governance of Europe before the
41
French Revolution.
It would be a mistake to overstate the success of these mixed economic/political efforts. For one thing, most of the eighteenth century
monarchs were only thinly committed to a liberalizing economic and political reform-immediate revenues were much more important to them.4 2
For another, they could only act within the confines of serious institutional
constraints, and in the face of increasingly shrill opposition from entrenched interests. 43 Even supposedly enlightened monarchs like Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great did little to alter the economic and
political privileges of the noble orders, or to reduce the noble domination
of a servile peasantry.4 Similarly, in France, anticompetitive guild organizations survived the "enlightened" royal policies that aimed to dispose of
them, 45 while an increasingly restive and assertive nobility thwarted all at-

46
tempts to make its members share the burden of taxes.
The reaction of these notables to economic and political reform in
some ways recalls the considerably more recent reaction of the heavily-entrenched Soviet Nomenklatura, for whom privilege had become a way of
life, and for whom capitalist reform was profoundly disruptive. 47 Despite
the eighteenth century monarchs' inroads on ancient economic privilege,
the decisive shift to capitalist property rights-freely acquired, freely
traded, divorced from any attachment to birth and status-came to Europe

anti-Semitic motion picture during the Nazi era. See the brief entry for the film director, Veidt
Harlan, in EPHRAIM KATz, THE FILM ENCYCLOPEDIA (2d ed. 1994).

41

For the "constituted bodies" and their role in Old Regime political life, see 1 R. R. PALMER,
27-30 (1959); see also C.B. BEHRENS, supra note 39, at 52-62,

THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

177-80.
42 C.B.A. BEHRENS, SocIErY, GOVERNMENT AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT. THE EXPERIENCES OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE AN PRUSSIA 124-28 (1985) (stressing the primacy of fiscalism and
centralization over liberalization in Prussian economic measures); GAGLIARDO, supra note 32, at
66 (noting institutional constraints and low commitment); Root, supra note 35, at 329-30
(describing the primarily fiscal motives of the French crown in liberalization).
43 GAGLIARDO, supra note 32, at 62-63 (increasing resistance); Root, supra note 35, at 321-26,
332-33 (resistance to change).
44 KRIEGER, supra note 33, at 297-300; for Frederick, see ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 151-55
(stressing Frederick's dependence on and sympathy for nobles); see aso KARL ERICH BORN,WIRTSCHAFT UND GESEU.SCHAFr IM DENKEN FRIEDRICHS DES GROSSEN 11-12

(1979) (explaining that

Frederick thought serfdom was disgraceful but also thought emancipation was an unacceptable
inroad on aristocracy). For Catherine, see ISABEL DE MADARiAGA, RUSSIA IN THE AGE OF CATHERINE THE GREAT 296-99 (1981) (describing how Catherine's dealings with nobles generally did not
alter status quo).
45 Root, supra note 35, at 333-34.
46 For the increasingly strident conflicts between crown and the "constituted bodies" in
France, see 1 PALMER, supra note 41, at 86-99, 448-65; for similar conflicts in Sweden and several
provinces of the Hapsburg Empire, see id. at 99-108. A few months before the outbreak of the
French Revolution, the most "enlightened" of all the monarchs, Joseph II of Austria, faced a
rebellion in his Belgian provinces when he tried to revoke the guild privileges of the local urban
elite; see it.
at 341-48.
47 Root, supra note 35, at 327, n.60 (noting the relationship between guild rules and Eastern
European socialist production: both regimes protected producers from having to meet consumer demand); cf HANDELMAN,supra note 13, at 110-13 (arguing that in post-Soviet Russia, old
nomenklatura has done well by aligning itself with the new underworld, which also resists economic reform).
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not with the enlightened monarchs, but with the French Revolution and
Napoleon, along with his various puppet states and imitators. 4 It was the
Emperor's widely-adopted Code Napoleon that solidified the Revolutionary concept that property could be freely earned and traded by all. 4 9
Precisely that last point, however, might give one pause. First of all, it
undermines the notion that modem European property regimes really do
have a bottom-up character; their origins suggest at least as much a topdown character. Second, those top-down regimes were most closely associated not with any direct effort to widen more general liberties, but rather
with the royal and imperial policies of building national treasuries for war.
Interestingly enough, this issue spilled into the American constitutional debates of the late 1780s, where the Anti-Federalists complained that
Federalist free market ideas were part of a monarchic scheme, aimed at
empire and mightiness instead of freedom. 50 In the Anti-Federalists' view,
the Federalist plans for a unified commercial nation supported a "natural
aristocracy" rather than well-established rights; they argued that this Federalist project was based on European ideas of large and powerful government-a regime that aimed not at liberty, but that was rather
"framed... with a view to arms, and war."'5 1
I do not want to suggest that all our modem property regimes derive
from top-down schemes, or more specifically from monarchs bent on war
and the revenues necessary thereto. Modern property and contract regimes clearly have vast numbers of bottom-up features. Commercial law
includes the bottom-up customs of merchants, while nuisance law defines
the boundaries of property by reference to the "reasonable" practices of
ordinary people. 5 2 Even a subject as formalistic as local zoning very largely
reflects the ways that property owners actually use their land.5 3 Indeed, it is
48 One of the dominating themes of Alexis de Tocqueville's OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION was the continuity between the pre-revolutionary monarchs and the Napoleonic legacy,
though Tocqueville stressed the relative weakness of the former. See, e.g., ALExuS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 19-20, 32 (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1955).
49 Andr6 Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW

WORLD 19, 38-40 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1956) (stating that the Code ratified Revolutionary abolition of feudal restrictions on property ownership and reaffirmed principles of freedom of contract). For the introduction of the Code in Napoleon's conquered states, see OWEN CONNELLY,
NAPOLEON's SATELLITE INGDOMS 41-42 (1965) (modified version in Italy); id. at 159-60 (noting

that the Code but not commercial law was introduced in Holland); id. at 222 (the Code was
introduced in Westphalia [West Germany)).
50 See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the FederalistEmpire: Anti-FederalismFrom the
Attack on "Monarchism" to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 89-93 (1989).
51 Id. "Framed for war" comes from the Essay of Brutus to the Citizens of New York (Jan. 2, 1788),
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALST 400 (HerbertJ. Storing ed. 1981). "The European

governments are almost all of them framed . .. with a view to arms, and war," a model that
"Brutus" eschewed for the American republic. Id. at 401.
52 See, e.g., Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 149 Mass. 103, 105 (1889) (explaining that "usual and
reasonable" use of property is not a nuisance).
53 See Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willow: Patternsof Land Use Coordinationin PreZoning New Haven (1870-1926), 101 YALE L. J. 617-37 (1991) (describing informal land use patterns that were later incorporated into zoning); see also Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of
"Nature'sMetropolis": The HistoricalContext of Illinois' Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
527, 569 (1992) (describing neighborhood consent requirements for some land uses in nineteenth century Chicago).
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arguable that top-down regimes themselves only derive from usurpations of
54
pre-existing bottom-up property.
But whatever the origins of top-down government itself, modern property regimes have some quite clear-cut and recognizably top-down aspects.
The property regime of modem China certainly seems to be imposed from
above. The new property and trading regimes of Eastern Europe also are
in large measure top-down, imposed from above to get rid of earlier topdown socialist regimes. The patterns in these modern nations have much
in common with the patterns of eighteenth century Europe, where
monarchs introduced capitalist property and trade for reasons that were
chiefly fiscal and military.
What we have to hope for is that the bottom-up activities of ordinary
citizens can supplant and overwhelm the dirigisteorigins of these modern
property regimes. But indeed, even in the well-established democracies,
some of the fanciest new forms of property simply could not exist without
extensive governmental, legal, and administrative apparatus-for intellectual property, for example, or for the "tradeable emission rights" that are
supposed to limit air pollution while adding flexibility to its regulation. 5 5
Summing up, then, the Priority Argument for property is normally
narrated as a bottom-up story, first of property and then of governance.
But in fact, the history of property regimes shows a strong streak of topdown features. From the top-down perspective, the central point of property and commerce is to build national strength and the ability to make
war. And in that top-down story, property's association with liberty is at
most accidental.
It may be worth mentioning that eighteenth century political economists were very much aware of the pattern of monarchic involvement with
economic development, and with the concomitant destruction of older
constitutional privileges. This matter caught the attention of James
Steuart, a writer associated with the Scottish Enlightenment school, but he
thought that the autocratic proclivities of the enlightened monarchs could
not long survive. According to Steuart, the very commerce, industry and
liberalized property that monarchs promoted-"principally with a view to
enrich themselves" and at the cost of traditionally privileged orderswould invigorate a new and opulent class of entrepreneurs. These individuals in turn would soon demand wider liberties and greater constraints on
56
arbitrary power.
Occasionally this same argument surfaces today about the autocratic
governance of modern China and other developing economies. Freely acquired property and free commerce, it is said, creates new entrepreneurial

54 For the pattern of such usurpation described in the "public choice" literature, see infra
text accompanying notes 72-75.

55 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, providing for tradeable "allowances" of acid rain
precursor emissions. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7651o (West 1995).
56 1 JAMEs STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLrrIcAL ECONOMY 248 (1767).
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classes with their own demand for liberty, overwhelming the very autocrats
57
who foster these enterprises.
But this argument means that the Priority Argument itself shifts quite
dramatically, so that the reason for property's centrality among rights takes
a different form. Now property is the central right not because it is the
primitive reason for government and indeed the measure of government
itself, but because the security of property makes other rights secure. This
brings us to the second argument.
II.

THE POWER-SPREADING ARGUMENT

Property is the most important of all rights because property diffuses power.
Unlike the Priority Argument, the best-known versions of the PowerSpreading Argument are the modern ones, particularly as they appeared in
Friedrich Hayek's 58 and Milton Friedman's 59 biting critiques of socialist regimes during the last half-century.
Those critiques were based on the political characteristics of socialist
regimes, rather than simply their economic aspects.
Putting the argument in a capsule form, these authors argued that free
market economies have a comparative political advantage, stemming from
the fact that they spread the ability to earn money and own property
throughout the citizenry. This means that free market economies permit
no particular persons or groups to entrench themselves in a monopolistic
control over the all aspects of life. Why not? Because wealth is an alternative source of power to politics, and as long as many people can own property and attempt to earn money, power-including political power-will
necessarily remain more or less diffused. 60 Money talks, and in a free market economy, the freedom that everyone has to own property or enter the
market, in any way that she chooses, means that many people can talk, and
they can and will resist the political temptations to suppress other rights.
Hence, on the Power-Spreading Argument, free-market economies,
and the widely held property ownership they entail, are structurally capable
of supporting an array of civil and political liberties-this by contrast with
socialist regimes, which centralize both political and economic power and
leave no room for alternative avenues to power. Judge Alex Kozinski, a
prominent figure on the Libertarian speaking circuit, made an implicit
57 See China's Challenge, MACLEAN's, Sept. 4, 1995, at 24 (reporting on the optimistic views of
William Overholt, author of CHINA: THE NEXT ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER. Overholt believes that
economic growth will give "the citizenry the confidence to demand [political] accountability, the
resources to impose these demands, and the education to make appropriate choices."). For
other developing countries, see, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Free Trade: Key Asian Value, FAR EASTERN
ECON. REv., Dec. 29, 1994, at 26 (citing Taiwan and Philippines as countries in which economic
liberalization created new middle classes, which in turn have called for political reform); Peter
Hyun, General Park, Citizen Kim, FAR EASTERN ECON. REv., Apr. 1, 1993, at 26 (making a similar
argument about South Korea); Nicholas D. Kristof, Ruthless Ex-Dictator Getting Creditfor South Korea's Rise, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1995, at A18 (same).
58 FRIEDRICH A- HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
59 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
60 FRIEDMAN, supranote 59, at 14-21; HAYEK, supra note 58, at 145-46.
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nod to this argument when he observed that if rational people were given
the choice, they might well prefer the right to build buildings or operate
railways to the right to wear obscene slogans on their clothing. 61 And why
not? If they can build buildings and operate railroads, they will soon be
able to wear whatever they please. This idea, roughly speaking, is the same
idea that James Steuart expressed in his perhaps wistful hopes for the encouragement to entrepreneurs by the Enlightened Despots of his day.
But in Steuart's time, there was another and quite different version of
this diffusion-of-power argument, perhaps especially interesting because it
requires an imaginative leap into a world with a very different understanding of the appropriate political order. Prior to the French Revolution,
most people in Europe thought that hierarchy was not at all an evil, but
rather a good idea, both in the realms of politics and economics. 62 The
basic idea was that ordinary human beings are too unruly to govern themselves without hierarchical ordering. In this view, people need hierarchy, as
a part of the natural order of things. Just as there is a Great Chain of Being
63
from God through the angels to humans and then to the lower animals,
so is hierarchical ordering the basic structure in human institutions as

66
65
well-in the family, 64 in the community, in the larger political regime.
Without hierarchical order, it seemed, things would simply fall apart.
In the eighteenth century, economic thought generated some of the
most important intellectual equipment to shake this view.
Economic
thinkers discovered "the market"-not the local Haymarket or Donkey
Market, 67 but rather the abstract and generalized market in which all goods
and services could trade against one another, until each arrived at equilibrium with all the others. 68 The stunning facet of this generalized and abstract "market" was that it seemed to run all by itself, in a natural ordering
that required no supervision from nosy authorities and their minions. 69
And if that was the case for the market-if people could acquire and trade
property without supervision-then who needed hierarchy in economic
matters? And if not for economic matters, then who needed hierarchy for

61

Alex Kozinski, Foreword: TheJudiciar and the Constitution, in ECONOrMc LmERTIES AND THE

JUDICIARY at xi, xvii (James A. Dom & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
62

Robert Darnton, What Was Revolutionary About the FrenchRevolution?, N. Y. REv. OF BOOKS,

Jan. 19, 1989, at 3, 4.
63 ARTHUR 0. LovEjoy, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1986). For the use of this metaphor in
the eighteenth century, see id. at 183-207; see also KEIT THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD
17-22 (1983) (arguing that animals were once considered entirely subordinate to human needs);
id. at 135-36 (arguing that the view relaxed somewhat by the eighteenth century).
64 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *416-20, 430-32 (describing the authority of the head of
household over spouse, children, and servants).
65 PETER LAsLErr, THE WORLD WE HAvE LosT- ENGLAND BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 21, 6266 (2d ed. 1971) (describing hierarchy in the preindustrial community).

66 For the widely-used metaphor of the commonwealth as a "body politic" with head, arms,
feet, etc, see, e.g. CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CRISIS OF THE PARUAMENTS: ENGUSH HISTORY, 1509-1660,

at 41-43 (1971).
67 As in the Eselmarkt in the Dutch city ofMaastrichtjust a few yards from a University building in which one version of this Article was presented. .
68 JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEw SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE
1790s 28-33 (1984) (describing the late seventeenth-early eighteenth century discovery of an abstract market, working as a "natural system").
69 Id. at 33.
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politics either?70 The critical point, then, was that the discovery of the market aroused the seductive thought that hierarchical control over the economy was unnecessary, and by extension, so was hierarchical control of
political life.
All this now seems quite archaic, but one can translate the most basic
argument into more modem terms with a bit of reflection on the recent
past of the authoritarian socialist regimes, particularly in Soviet views on
the leading role of the Communist Party. At least in what was supposed to
be a transition stage to true communism, the people were thought to be
incapable of organizing their own economic and political affairs; they
needed the hierarchy of the Party-the cutting edge of the proletariateto govern these matters for everyone. 71 With the collapse of those authoritarian socialist regimes, of course, the market was supposed to take over
economic ordering as a kind of natural force: no one needed the Communist Party to run the economy, and by extension no one needed the Party
to run political life either. Hence even as peculiar as the older discussion
of hierarchy now seems, twentieth century history has a few eerie echoes.
But modem experience also suggests some of the practical difficulties
of the Power-Spreading Argument. The first problem is extensively discussed in American political thought, particularly in the "public choice"
branch of political science. The problem is that even initially-diffuse
wealth winds up concentrating itself, particularly through politics. According to the public choice theorists, people with relatively narrow but intense
interests can capture the political process from those with wide but diffuse
interests. 72 When they do so, they can pull up the gangplank behind themselves, and secure to themselves the special privileges, monopoly
franchises, subsidies, and tax breaks that make their lives so easy, while
making the lives of competitors and consumers more costly and difficult. 73
Commodities producers are a case in point. Through what seem to be unbreakable locks on legislatures the world over, agriculturalists, lumberers,
miners, and ranchers enjoy price supports, import limits, subsidized water
and transportation, and special rights to use public resources-and then
they cite their foreign competitors' subsidies as ajustification for their own
continued support.7 4 Do they want diffusion of power, particularly eco70 Id. at 34, 95.
71

ROBERT H. McNEAL, THE BOLSHEVIK TRADMON 71 (1963) (describing the Party's elite role

as Lenin's lasting bequest to the Soviet Communism).
72 For the classics in this literature, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN &

GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); MANCUR
OLSON,JR., THE LOGIC OF'COLLECrIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).

73 For an interesting historical application, see Barry Baysinger et al., Mercantilism as a RentSeeking Society, inJAMES M. BUCHANAN, ET AL., TowARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY

235-36 (1980) (quoting Adam Smith's observation that merchants and manufacturers teamed
with Parliament to impose mercantilist restraints on enterprise).
74 See, e.g., Jill Lancelot & Ralph De Gennaro, Green Scissors Snip $33 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1995, at A21 (describing efforts to curb agricultural, ranching, and other commodities subsidies on environmental grounds). For ranchers on public lands, see infra text accompanying note
81. For agricultural subsidies, see, e.g., BarnabyJ. Feder, Crop Subsidies: Help and Headaches, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 1994, at D1 (describing the argument that American farmers' subsidies are necessary because of foreign subsidies); Andrew Pollack,Japan Torn Between U.S. andAsians, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1995, at A6 (describing Japan's efforts to protect its agricultural sector from foreign
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nomic power? Don't bet the farm on it. Special interests are much more
likely to want to keep the goodies for themselves. And to a surprising degree, they succeed, even in democratic governments. Indeed, they succeed
so well that one prominent author in the public choice school, MancurOlson, thinks that the natural fate of economic forces in stable govern-

75
ments is to drift toward oligopoly.

A second but closely related practical problem is a kind of cruel logic
of entrenchment once monopolistic interests have captured a favored
place, the only practical routes to the diffusion of economic power may be
quite unsettling to a regime of property rights. 76 In continental Europe, it
took a revolution and a strong man to dislodge the prior monopolistic impediments to the acquisition of wealth. The nations and satellites of the
former Soviet Union too may prove the point: short of the use of force,
one cannot extensively diffuse property rights or even property opportunities without addressing the old Party interests. Either those old interests
must be paid off, or something like a coup must oust them, and neither
alternative seems particularly attractive.7 7 We in the United States should
not be too quick to criticize; we ourselves seem to have great difficulty in
divesting ourselves of market intrusions as relatively simple as local rent
78
control or national agricultural subsidies.
The public choice literature has given a name to this kind of problem:

the "transitional gains trap."7 9 Here is the scenario: some people play the
political system to get special entitlements or monopoly status. Then they
get used to their special entitlements, organize their affairs around them,
and capitalize the entitlements into their deals.8 0 This means, for example,
that public lands grazing entitlements get factored into the price that a
stockman pays for the adjacent ranch. Thus, abolishing low-fee grazing
permits does not simply threaten this year's earnings-it threatens the
value of the ranch itself, which may explain the adamant objections to alterations in grazing fee structure. 8 '
competition); cf.David Hosansky, DepressionEra ProgramsFace Sweeping Changes, CONG. Q., Nov.
18, 1995, 3523 (describing recent efforts to reduce agricultural supports dramatically).
75 MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AN DECLINE OF NATIONS 74 (1982) (summarizing the general
scheme); id. at 75-78 (comparing West European countries and Britain); id.at 151 (premodern
Japan); cf.id at 177-80 (suggesting that drift to monopolization occurs with or without governmental assistance).
76 See, e.g., BORN,supra note 44, at 11-12 (explaining how Frederick II of Prussia excoriated
serfdom but thought it could not be abolished without compensating the nobility); Root, supra
note 35, at 332 (describing the French effort to abolish guilds which caused crisis among guild
creditors). See also BENTHAM, Civil Code, suprq note 5, at 119-20 (arguing that the principle of
security forbade abolition of slavery and serfdom).
77

See Paul B. Stephan III, PrivatizationAfter Perestroyka: The Impact of State Structure, 14 WHrr-

TIER L. REV. 403, 421-25 (1993) (noting the moral unattractiveness of benefitting former Soviet
officials, but also the difficulty and disruptiveness of purge).
78 On agricultural subsidies, see, e.g. Keith Bradsher, Budget Ax Misses in Swing at Sugar-Crop
Aid, N.Y. TMF-s, Sept. 29, 1995, at Al, A26. On rent control, see ANTHONY DowNs, RIDENTIAL
RENT CONTROLS: AN EVALUATION 1-2 (1988) (concluding that rent control usually makes
shortages worse).

79 Gordon Tullock, The TransitionalGains Trap, in BuCHANAN, supra note 73, at 211.
80 Id. at 212-14.
81 For an early example, see PHILLIP 0. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS 174-75 (1960) (describing
ranchers' objections to the first federal grazing fees). For current controversies, see, e.g.,
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Ultimately, one may not be able to get rid of these special favors, benefits, perks, and privileges without undermining the security of people's expectations about their property.8 2

That prospect, however, pits the

diffusion of power against a Benthamite perspective. The Power-Spreading
function of property only works if property itself is diffusely-held, but once
property is concentrated, the process of dispersing it might undercut property's all-important economic role-that is, making owners feel secure.
A final problem with the Power-Spreading Argument is perhaps the
most basic: the diffusion of property and economic power is not entirely
desirable, because diffusion sometimes raises the same problems as concentration of property-entrenchment, rigidity, and ultimately insecurity. The
legal doctrine that is most likely to diffuse property is undoubtedly the Rule
of Capture, or First Possession, as it is often called: when something is unowned, then property rights go to the first taker. The Rule of Capture,
however, can cause difficulties, particularly when it is applied to environmental or common resources like air and water. An individual factory, a
home furnace, or even an automobile may burn fuel that pollutes the surrounding air-that is, these activities use up some portion of a common
resource. When there are only a few polluters, it really does not matter;
dilution through the air can neutralize the effects, just as dilution through
flowing waters can neutralize a considerable amount of pollution.8 3
When these polluting activities become more intense, they may become exponentially more disruptive and costly.8 4 But by that time, pol-

luters have a transitional gains trap of their own: they have become used to
polluting, they have made capital expenditures on that basis, and they
think they are entitled to continue to pollute, just in the same way they always have. And their neighbors may well think, "If X can pollute, then I
should be able to too." They all think that if they are required to stop, they
must be compensated.
The point is that the diffusion of power can cause a kind of entrenchment as well. People come to think that they have entrenched rights to
continue the Rule of Capture and that they can continue to take things
"for free" from the commons, even when those common resources have
become scarce and fragile.
In fact, at the extreme, too much diffusion of power is not compatible
with a regime of property at all. Take for example modem Amazonia,
where First Possession is the order of the day, and where loggers, wildcat
Timothy Egan, In Battle Over PublicLands, RanchersPush PublicAside, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at
Al, A12 (describing ranchers' counterattack on Interior Secretary's efforts to reduce
overgrazing).
82 Tullock, supra note 79, at 211 (describing this phenomenon as a "paradoxi-

cally.., inefficient portion of the Paretian frontier").
83 See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New TakingsJurisprudence-An
Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REv. 577, 585-86 (1990).

84 Id. at 585-86. I use the term "exponential" because pollution may have rising marginal
costs. This is reflected, for example, in environmental and public health considerations of "dosage" of pollutants; small amounts of a toxin may be harmless, while slightly larger dosages may
cause disproportionately higher harms. See, e.g., David D. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chlo-

ride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 500, 513-14
(1978) (discussing the relationship of dosage to harm).
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miners, would-be ranchers, and everyone else take what they can, as fast as
they can. 85 Economic power that is this diffuse is not a regime of stable
property, and it is not a regime of other civil liberties either. It is a regime
of violence. 8 6 Indeed, it is just the kind of violence that John Locke
thought called for the institution of government.
In fact, property regimes occupy a middle ground in the diffusion-ofpower scale. Totally diffuse power is not really compatible with property at
all; property can do little to help safeguard other rights in a regime where
the governing principle is dog-eat-dog.
III.

THE INDEPENDENCE ARGUMENT

Property is the keystone right because property makes individuals independent and thus capable of self-government.
The central idea of the Independence Argument is that property
removes people's dependence on others, and fundamental autonomy
makes them capable of exercising unencumberedjudgment in the political
forum. Hence all political powers, and certainly all the other rights, depend on the right to property.
Not just any old property will do for the Independence Argument,
however. The foundational property for independence was deeply aristocratic in Old Regime Europe: the archetypical form was large and longstanding landownership. The owner of such property was in effect the
"independent" head of a small regime. As such he had a dual role in governing; not only did he head his own little fiefdom, but he also had a role
in the larger principality, as a kind of co-regent or co-governor with the
87
crown.
In the American colonies and the new United States, the civic republican version of the Independence Argument was similar in principle, even
though landownership was much more widely distributed.8 8 In this republican version, the landowner was not a man of noble birth but rather a
yeoman farmer.8 9 But the yeoman farmer himself was the head of a self85 See, e.g., JUAN DE ONIs, THE GREEN CATHEDRAL: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AMAZONIA
64-71, 93, 145-50 (1992).
86 Id. at 19-20; see also Carol M. Rose, A Tale of Two Rivers, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 1623, 1632 (1993)
(reviewing DE ONIS, supranote 85, and THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE WATERS OF NEW ENGLAND (1991)).
87 See Dietrich Gerhard, Problems of Representation and Delegation in the Eighteenth Century, in
LIBER MMORIuALS SIR MAuRICE POwICRE 117,123, (1965) (using the term "co-governor"). Montesquieu called the aristocracy an "intermediate power" in monarchies, and though he called the

nobility "subordinate" and "dependent," he also argued that they were the barrier against arbitrariness and despotism, and that monarchies could not exist without them. See 1 MONTESQuIEU,
1 SPmrr OF THE LAWS 18-20 (facsimile reprod. 1984) (1751); see also FRANKUN FORD, ROBE AND
SwoRD: THE REGROUPING OF THE FRENCH AISTOCRAcY AFTER LOUIS XIV 239 (1953) (discussing
Montesquieu's idea of intermediate powers).
88 CAROL M. ROSE, "Takings" and the Practicesof Property. Property as Wealth, Property as "Propriety," in CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 49, 61-62 (1994) (and sources cited thereiri).

For the role of property in civic republicanism, see generally Gregory S. Alexander, Time and
Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273 (1990-91).
89 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 88, at 311-16 (describing Jefferson's insistence on small
independent landholding (allodial title) rather than large-scale feudal landholding); see also
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sufficient domain, including as "dependents" his wife, children, and slaves
or servants. His property gave him a complete livelihood; he needed no
one, not even commercial traders. This independence enabled him to
speak freely and without hesitation in the political forum.
Note that this older Independence Argument for property had several
features. First, the Argument generally meant that land was an especially
significant type of property. Only land could sustain all the necessities of
life, and thus provide an independent haven for its owner. Commercial
wealth did not yield independence, because trade by its nature forces one
to rely on others, through all the intricate webs of contracts, supplies, services, and buying and selling. 90 It is no accident that in seventeenth century
England, men who made fortunes in commerce attempted to buy land; 91
the same held true of the "nobility of the robe" in France, the newlywealthy aristocracy who owed their noble status to the purchase of judicial
offices. 92 It is no accident that Montesquieu thought that monarchies
needed to preserve the landholdings of the nobility and to discourage
nobles from engaging in commerce. 93 And it is no accident that Jefferson
spoke as if the ideal property were landed property, of a size and scale
appropriate to republican independence. 94 Even the economicallyminded Physiocratic thinkers favored agricultural property; indeed, it was
one of Adam Smith's great achievements to make commercial property
95
seem important too.

A second feature of the older Independence Argument was hierarchy.
In the European version, the quintessentially independent actor was the
landed aristocrat. The American civic republican version flattened the hiCAROL

M.

ROSE,

Ancient Constitution Versus FederalistEmpire: Antifederalismfrom the Attack on "Mon-

archism" to Modem Localism in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra note 88, at 71, 92 (describing the

centrality of the yeoman farmer in Anti-Federalist arguments).
90 For republican mistrust of non-landed, commercial types of property, see LACY K. FORD,
JR., THE ORIGINS OF SOUTHERN RADICALISM: THE SOUTH CAROLINA UPCOUNTRY, 1800-1860, at 52,
73-74 (1988); see also Alexander, supra note 88, at 285-90. For the republican distrust of commerce for fostering uncontrolled desires for physical goods, see Joyce Appleby, Consumption in
Early Modem Social Thought, in CONSUMPTION AND THE WORLD OF GOODS 162, 167 (John Brewer &
Roy Porter eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONSUMPTION].
91 LAWRENCE STONE, AN OPEN ELITE? ENGLAND 1540-1880, at 13 (1984) (describing the prestige and political authority of landholding). The actual impact of new entry into the landed
aristocracy has been a subject of very heated debate. SeeW. A. SPECK, STABIuTY AND STRIFE: ENGLAND 1714-1760, at 70-74 (1977) (summarizing the shifting scholarship concerning landownership between 1500 and 1800). The overall picture shows professional and commercial families
actively engaged in land purchases, but at a somewhat declining rate by the eighteenth century.
Accord STONE, supranote 91, at 208, 210, 397-400. However, Stone has generally argued the long-

term stability of the landed elite. See id. at 400-02; see also Fred Bosselman, FourLandEthics: Order,
Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439, 1463-66, 1466 n.100 (1994) (pointing out
that David Ricardo, whose early nineteenth century theory of "economic rent" implicitly undercut landed wealth in favor of entrepreneurial wealth, himself bought an estate in the country).

92 FORD, supranote 87, at 165-69 (describing this new aristocracy's entry into landholding).
93 1 MONTESQUIEU, supranote 87, at 66-67 (suggesting that the monarchies' laws should preserve entail since noble honor attaches to fiefs); 2 id. at 14 (commenting that English practice of
allowing nobles in commerce weakened the monarchy).
94 See Alexander, supra note 88, at 288-90 (notingJefferson's seeming favoritism toward small
landowning and ambivalence toward commerce and manufacturing); id. at 311-16 (describing
Jefferson's preference for allodial over feudal landholding).
95 For the physiocrats on agriculture, see BEHRENS, supra note 42, at 133-36. See also KRIEGER,
supra note 33, at 198-99.
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erarchical pyramid, but here too, only a mature male, the yeoman farmer
head of the household, was a truly independent person. 96 It was perfectly
consistent with that version of republicanism that married women and servants, who were themselves considered dependent, should not own any of
the property that rendered a man independent and thus should play no
97
political role.

Interestingly enough, the modem version of the Independence Argument is radically different. The basic idea is still there-that property nurtures the independence necessary for political participation-but in its
modem permutation, this idea becomes a platform for distributive rights.
The modem form of the Independence Argument is that all people should
have a voice in the political order, but to acquire that voice they need a
secure baseline of property-and if necessary, this baseline must be secured by redistribution. 98
Needless to say, this modem version of the Independence Argument
drops the distinctive features of the older version. Most notably, the bias in
favor of land has completely vanished. In modem discussions, baseline entitlements are just as apt to be described as the right to employment, health
care, shelter, or the right to such human capital as education. 99 If anything, these "new property" rights foresee relational forms of wealth that
have nothing to do with the older stress on landed self-sufficiency. Moreover, the newer version has no trace of hierarchy. Quite the contrary, this
version is profoundly anti-hierarchical; it begins with the vision of equal
rights to participate in politics, and carries through by reorganizing property entitlements to meet that end.
But precisely that point raises a predictable economic critique of the
modem Independence Argument: as a variant on distributional rights, the
Argument could have destabilizing effects on property as conventionally
96 Robert Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335,
351-52 (1989). Steinfeld notes, however, the strain placed on hierarchy by republican norms. Irat 348-51.

97 Steinfeld, supra note 96, at 337, 344-47; see also FORRrs

McDoNALD, Novus ORDo

SECLORUM: THE INTEL.ECrUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 25-27 (1985). A trace of the older

view-that "dependent" persons and especially women cannot speak "independently"- may still
affect women's credibility in courtroom settings. See, e.g., Kathy Mack, ContinuingBarriersto Women's Credibility: A FeministPerspective on the ProofProcess, 4 CuM. L.F. 327, 329-31 (1993) (describing disbelief in women's speech patterns as opposed to men's "powerful" speech patterns); see also
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describingand Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem ofExpert
Testimony on Battering,9 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 195, 218 (1986) (arguing that use of expert testimony in abuse cases suggests that women wimesses alone are disbelieved).
98 SeeFrank I. Michelman, Propertyas a ConstitutionalRigh4 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1112
(1981); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 785-86 (1964). For an effort to
combine the older and newer versions of "independence," see Frank Michelman, Possession vs.
Distribution in the ConstitutionalIdea of Property, 72 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1329-30 (1987); cf. Akhil
Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 37, 38-42 (1990) (distinguishing traditional and modern versions). For somewhat less
overtly political versions of independence, see STEVEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 241-46
(1990) (discussing the minimum entitlements necessary for "a decent human life in society");
MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L REv. 957 (1982) (arguing that property
is necessary for self-development).
99 See, e.g., MUNZER, supra note 98, at 241, 245; see alsoAmar, supranote 98, at 40-41 (mentioning education as a "safety net" when land "runs out" since both are constructs giving individuals a
"minimum stake" in society).
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understood. Any claims of the poor to a baseline must be satisfied from
some source, and that source is likely to derive from taxation or confiscation from other citizens. This solution elicits not only libertarian outrage,
but also the standard utilitarian litany: redistributional rights are a kind of
forced sharing, and could discourage industry, undermine enterprise, sap
the very energy that creates wealth, and in the end, leave a smaller pie of
social wealth. 10 0
Cass Sunstein has studied the modern Eastern European constitutional movement and suggests a rather different reason for caution: constitutional entitlements to "new property" or what Sunstein calls "positive
rights"-minimum income levels, housing, and the like-may never be capable of practical fulfillment, and consequently, may never be treated as
creating legally binding entitlements. While approving of redistributional
programs as a policy matter,' 0 ' Sunstein argues that if such matters are
called rights-turning societal aspirations into "aspirational rights"-they
generally may give rights a bad name: they suggest that one may have
10 2
"rights" that can never be fulfilled or legally enforced.
Perhaps most significant for present purposes, Sunstein's caveats suggest that the Independence Argument could undermine itself. On his account, if the new version of the Independence Argument means that
property is at least partially an aspirational right, then property, understood as independence, may weaken other rights rather than supporting
them.
Sunstein's caveat about the Independence Argument is fundamentally
a warning about the impact of rhetoric, and it brings into focus the rhetorical or symbolic relation of property rights to other rights.
IV.

THE SYMBOLIC ARGUMENT

Property is the keystone right because it symbolizes all other rights.
This Argument for property rests on a phenomenon that one notices
often in the rhetoric of rights. It may be a matter of human cognition, but
property analogies have a way of creeping into people's talk about all kinds
of rights. The most notable example is no doubt the Holmsean metaphor
of "the marketplace of ideas," which suggests that free speech consists not
merely of standing on soapboxes and speaking, but rather means hawking
the ideas as if they themselves were so many boxes of soap.
An older and almost equally famous use of the property metaphor appeared in a journal article by James Madison, in which he described him100 See, e.g., EpsjrN, supra note 3, at 343; William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of
Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. 1, 35 (1985) (suggesting that "new property" rights may conflict with
traditional property rights); see also Civil Code, supra note 5, at 120-21 (arguing that egalitarian
concerns must yield to the security of property). Interestingly enough, Bentham himself approved of legislated relief for the poor, at least to those in absolute want. Civil Code, supra note 5,
at 127-33. He could not refrain from the icy observation that "a law which offers to indigence an
aid independent of industry is, to a certain extent, a law against industry." Id. at 128.
101 Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 907, 917 (1993).
102 Id at 919-20.
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self as having a property in his religious beliefs, his reputation, and in a
whole array of other matters. 10 3 Madison's use of property here suggests
that the metaphor of property is the route by which people can visualize
10 4
rights generally.
If property is so important for the visualization of all rights, then property itself becomes the critically important right: it is the symbolic means
through which people convey and receive the meaning of all rights. If my
property can be taken with impunity, speech and religion may come next.
But if I am secure in my property, then I have the intellectual tools to
understand what rights mean; I can think and talk about my other rights
and convince other people that they too have an interest in protecting
those rights.
But there are many challenges to this Symbolic Argument. One is
that property is at best an incomplete and misleading symbol for other
rights, a critique that is implicit in the work of Margaret Radin. As she
points out, people normally think of property as imbued with characteristics that may or may not inhere in other rights; in particular, property
10 5
rights are normally attributed to things that an owner can buy and sell.
Radin's work on "inalienability" argues that in some domains, the normal
property attributes of buying and selling may be inappropriate-e.g. selling
children, selling one's self into slavery, selling sexual services. 10 6 Extending
Radin's argument, consider the consequences of using normal property as
a central symbol for rights generally: do we want people to buy and sell
their rights to vote or speak? Would we want government to be able to
acquire by eminent domain the right to assembly or freedom of religion?
That is, would we approve of a governmental taking of such rights, so long
07
as the owner is compensated?
The point of these rhetorical questions is that other rights have functions and characteristics that are different from those conventionally understood as property. To use property as a symbol for them may not help
us to understand those functions and characteristics, but may rather mislead us.
If Radin implicitly challenges the Symbolic Argument, Jennifer Nedelsky does so explicitly. Nedelsky has traced out the idea of property's symbolic centrality, and like Radin, she concludes that property is at best a
blurred and messy stand-in for other rights.' 08 Property, she argues, is far
too implicated in its economic role to act as a surrogate for non-economic
103 James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
104 See NEDELSKY, supra note 17, at 21-22 (suggesting that although this statement is "atypical"

of Madison, he was attempting to borrow property's esteem to extend to other rights).
105
106

MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1854 (1987).
See, e.g., id. at 1910.

107 Id. at 1854 n.21, 1887 n.139 (describing some traditional liberal concepts of inalienable
rights); see also Lawrence Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma ofDependenc, 99 HAv. L. REv. 330, 332-33 (1985) (describing some "relational" rights as inalienable because they are not focused on the individual as such but on the
avoidance of hierarchy, for example between governors and governed).
108 NEDELSEY, supra note 17, at 207-11 (discussing this concept in a sub-tide called "The Distorted Lens of Property").
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rights. More specifically, property as a right is inextricably linked with existing distributions of wealth. The language of property rights makes citizens think that those distributions are natural and untouchable; it masks
the degree to which property itself is the product of social and political
decisions, and it impedes the discussion of the real political issues inherent
in the confrontation of individual autonomy with collective democratic
decisionmaking. 109
Nedelsky's objections to property's "mythic" qualities" recall one
vivid and explicitly Marxist critique of property, revived to some degree by
the scholars of the Critical Legal Theory movement. On the Marxist account, the notion of "property rights" is a kind of false consciousness-a set
of concepts that laborers believe, contrary to their own best interests, never
realizing that these very concepts simply naturalize the ways in which capitalists systematically bilk them of the true value of their efforts."' The Critical Legal Theorists point out that property rights are only one variant of
what Mark Tushnet calls "rights-talk"-a part of the intellectual equipment
by which the wealthy and powerful confuse, isolate, and disempower the
disadvantaged." 2 Indeed, on the Marxist and Critical account, property
rights might be the most egregious example of the way that rights-talk bolsters domination."13 If property symbolizes rights, then, it is only because,
like property rights, the whole baggage of rights is corrupt-a kind of rhetorical diversionary tactic to cement the hegemony of the ruling classes.1 14
An oddly similar but considerably less theoretical objection to the Symbolic Argument might be dubbed the Curmugeon's Critique. The
Curmugeon agrees that rights-talk is corrupt, but for a different reason.
Among other things, she is a believer in tort reform, because she thinks
109 Id. at 242-49, 253-54, 271-72.
110 Id. at 246 (discussing this concept in a sub-title called "The Mythic Power of Property").
111 See KaRL MARx, CAPITAL, in MARx 354-55, 361, 366 (M. Adler, ed., 1955) (describing capitalist "primitive accumulation," expropriation of workers' labor justified by property rights, and
workers' belief in the natural character of capitalist relations). Some modem scholars state that
Marx himself did not use the term "false consciousness," however. For the modem discussion of
the role of false consciousness in Marx, see MicHELE BA.RTr, THE Pourrics OF TRUTH FROM
MARX TO FOUCAULT 4-17 (1991).

112

See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. Rav. 1363, 1382-84, 1387-88, 1393-94

(1984) (suggesting that rights language obfuscates issues and advances interests of the powerful);
see also MARx KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrrIcA. LEGAL STUDIES 270-71, 282 (1987) (describing Critical

Legal Studies positions); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. Ray. 1563, 1577, 1596 (1982) (suggesting that rights concepts isolate
individuals and may fragment social movements).

113 See, e.g.,Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property,86 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1, 44-47 (1991) (using
the example of Native Americans to illustrate the partiality and injustice of property definitions);
see a/soJames L. Kainen, Nineteenth CenturyInterpretationsof the FederalContract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. Ray. 381, 399-402, 451, 461
(1982) (arguing that elite groups depicted various self-serving legal doctrines as natural).
114 The Critical critique of rights-talk has generated a certain counter-criticism among writers
interested in the status of women and minorities. For example, Elizabeth Schneider argues from
her work with battered women that the concept of entitlement is indeed rhetorical and cultural,
but that learning concepts of rights can be a critical step in getting people to regard themselves as

equal players in the community. See Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REy. 589, 597-98, 611-12 (1986); see also PatriciaJ.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructionIdealsfrom DeconstructedRights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
401, 410 (1987) (arguing that rights rhetoric can be effective for minorities).
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that modem western societies are already vastly too rights-conscious.
Rights-talk is all over the place, she thinks, and it pai~oyses us: schoolchildren's rights, animal rights, plant rights, gun-owners' rights, victims' rights,
rights of this, rights of that-no one can move for fear of violating some
right or other. On the Curmugeon's view, property may well symbolize
rights, but that is a strike against it. We should be thinking less about rights
altogether, and more about ways to get things done; if property rights make
it easier for us to visualize other rights, then property be damned.
The Curmugeon's view presupposes that rights-talk in general, and
property rights-talk in particular, has an ossifying effect on action. But this
raises an unanswered issue in the general discussion of property-as-symbolof-rights. Let us suppose that property is indeed a central or at least a partial symbol for rights generally: what is the symbol for property? It is easy
to answer that land is that symbol. For most people, a house (adorned with
a picket fence) is very likely to come to mind when the unmodified noun
"property" is spoken, and among lawyers, "property law" means the law of
real property.11 5
But why is land-immovable, enduring land-the central symbol for
property? Why not, say, water? Water, after all, is in fact the subject of
important and valuable property rights, and indeed, concerns about water
can substantially modify the rules about land." 6 If water were our chief
symbol for property, we might think of property rights-and perhaps other
rights-in a quite different way. We might think of rights literally and figuratively as more fluid and less fenced-in; we might think of property as
entailing less of the awesome Blackstonian power of exclusion and more of
the qualities of flexibility, reasonableness and moderation, attentiveness to
others, and cooperative solutions to common problems. Those qualities
law-however
are in fact even a part of landed property-as in nuisance
7
little the symbol of landed property may suggest them."
More than a trace of that more fluid and cooperative vision of property lies in the next argument for property's centrality.
V.

THE

CIVILIZING ARGUMENT

Property is the keystone right because the acquisition and management of
property inculcates the moral and civil behavior on which rights depend.
The Civilizing Argument sounds rather peculiar to modem ears. In
our own time, the common-sense picture of property's relation to morality
is probably closer to a Marxist view. On that depiction, property is at best a
concession to the flawed character of human beings, and at worst an open
115 The same pattern appears in law school textbooks for classes on property; after brief introductions, most deal almost exclusively with landed property.
116

See, e.g., Smu YAN TANG, INSTITUTIONS AND CoLLECrvE AcTION: SELF-GOvERNANCE N IIu-

GATION 73-74 (1992) (describing the pattern of scattered land ownership as a response to irrigation risk and the need for collective action).
117 See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1387 (arguing that most property regimes are in fact eclectic mixtures of individual and group property).
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gate to insufferable egocentrism, through which people grasp more, more,
more for me, me, me.
Much medieval and early-modem culture was especially hostile to
commercially-acquired property and regarded commerce as an activity of a
largely despised class-despised precisely because commercial dealers supposedly acquired the habits of avarice and mean-spiritedness. One sees this
attitude in artworks of the later Middle Ages, which typically represent capitalist or commercial enterprise in the guise of an ape or monkey, sometimes depicted as unwillingly defecating money. 1 18 This depiction may be
the original picture of anal retentiveness, and it is not at all a picture of
virtue. Even later, eighteenth century Europe's vastly increased consumerism only recast the moral doubts about commerce: now commerce and
trade were questioned as fomenters of pointless yearnings for material
goods and as underminers of republican restraint."19
But some eighteenth century economic thinkers-particularly those
associated with the Scottish Enlightenment-tried to alter attitudes about
the commercial pursuit of property, by transforming the singularly unattractive sin of avarice into the sociable sense of "interest." 20 On this account, commerce was a moral antidote to the pride, violence and vainglory
of aristocrats. 12 1 In contrast to highstrung aristocratic bellicosity, they said,
commerce was calm and above all "gentle."1 2 2 Would businessmen dream
of fighting duels? Of course not. That is because commerce requires one
to focus not on others' slights to one's own honor, but rather on satisfying
the others' wants and interests. Commerce thus inculcates sociability and
consideration, softening and civilizing rough manners instead of exacerbating them. 123 In this intellectual turnabout, the interdependency of commercial dealings, once considered cause for suspicion, turns out to be a
fount of virtue.

118

Lester Y. Little, PrideGoes Before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin Christendom, 76

Am.Hisr. REv. 16, 37-39, 44 (1971). Moral qualms about commerce continued to be expressed
even in the very commercial Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence
16-20 (1995) (draft paper on file with author) (describing Dutch moralist literature).
119 Appleby, in CONSUMPTION, supra note 90, at 164-67. For increased consumerism, see Jan
de Vries, Between PurchasingPower and the World of Goods: Understandingthe Household Economy in
Early Modern Europe, in CONSUMPTION, supra note 90, at 85, 100-01, 107-15 (describing an "industrious revolution" accompanying greater availability of consumer goods).
120 ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE IinERESTS 54-56 (1977).

121 Id. at 56-63.
122 Id. at 61-62. For the somewhat different accommodation of aristocratic values to wealth in
the phenomenon of "dandyism," see Colin Campbell, UnderstandingTraditionaland Modern Patterns of Consumption in Eighteenth-Centuy England: A Character-Action Approach, in CONSUMPTION,
supra note 90, at 40, 49-52 (dandy retained aristocratic characteristics of stoicism and
imperturbability).
123 Appleby, in CONSUMPTION, supranote 90, at 168. Hirschman's account suggests a feminiz-

ing description of commerce. See HIRSCHmAN, supra note 120, at 61-62. For a study of women's
consumption in the eighteenth century, see Amanda Vickery, Women and the World of Goods: A
Lancashire Consumer and Her Possessions, 1751-81, in CONSUMPTION, supra note 90, at 274.
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Marx and Engels were soon to ridicule the notion of "gentle commerce,", of course, 24 and even earlier, Alexander Hamilton suggested that
the notion was preposterous, at least insofar as it predicted that a widening
commerce would foster peace among nations. Commercial nations, he
said, are just as driven as any others by jealousy and fear-and they had
better prepare themselves for the attacks of those who hope to plunder
25
them.
But recent historical scholarship suggests that there may indeed have
been some truth in the old thesis about "gentle commerce." Although the
issue is certainly contested, 26 some historians of the last generation have
linked the early nineteenth century's burgeoning commerce to the rise of
new and vastly expanded forms of philanthropy. One thesis has it that
through trade, commercial dealers became interested in people who were
very distant from themselves, both socially and geographically. The traders
felt some sympathy for the situation of those distant others, and perhaps
most importantly, felt that they could make some difference in righting the
wrongs that afflicted them. 127 And interestingly enough, some modem
game theory experiments appear to confirm that complete strangers can
develop strong social and moral bonds simply through the cultivation of
trading relationships, especially when those relationships depend on mu28
tual commitment and trust

Perhaps the most interesting depiction of the way that the pursuit of
property influences the "moral sentiments" lies in Alexis de Tocqueville's
portrait of mid-nineteenth century Americans. Tocqueville thought that
Americans were intoxicated by trade and commerce, even with respect to
that most aristocratic of possessions-land-which Americans seemed to
regard as just one more commodity. 29 How did this ubiquitous commercial buzz affect personality? Tocqueville's picture shows a people whose
prodigious commercial activities left them restless and impelled them to
even greater levels of commotion; I3 0 but those activities also left them
largely unconcerned with social distinctions, 13 1 sympathetic to all kinds of
124 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 120, at 62 n.aa; see also Albert 0. Hirschman, Rival Intkpretations of
Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, orFeeble, 20J. ECON. Lrr. 1463, 1467-68 (1982) [hereinafter
Rival Interpretations] (describing the Marxist view that capitalist douceurwas self-destructive).
125 THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
126 The most controversial issue for historians has been the relation of commerce to the
growth of the antislavery movement. See, e.g., David Brion Davis, Reflections on Abolitionism and
IdeologicalHegemony, 92 AM. HisT. REv. 797 (1987) (expressing skepticism about the relation of
capitalism and philanthropic antislavery); Seymour Drescher, The Long Goodbye: Dutch Capitalism
and Antislavery in ComparativePerspective, 99 AM. HIST.Rxv. 44, 4749 (1994) (same). See generally,
CAPITALISM AND ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (Thomas Bender, ed.,
1992).
127 Thomas Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility (pt. 2), 90 AM.
Hisr. Rxv. 547, 549-59 (1985).
128 Peter Kollock, The Emergence of ExchangeStructures: An ExperimentalStudy of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust 100 AM. J. SocIoL. 313, 337-38 (1994).
129

2 ALXIs DE TocQuEW.E, DEMocRAcy IN AMmucA 163-67, 24748 (Phillips Bradley ed.

1945).
130 1 id,
at 305; 2 id,at 144-47.
131 2 ia at 161-62 (reporting that all professions are considered honorable); i. at 190-92
(discussing egalitarian master/servant relations).
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people, 3 2 generally respectful of other peoples' rights, 3 3 and infused with
a kind of can-do attitude and capacity to work with others to get things
done.13 4 These traits, if true, seemed to confirm the thesis that commercial
pursuits help to instill sociable qualities-though Tocqueville clearly
thought that they also corresponded to a platitudinous and shallow intel135
lectual life.
Do we have a modem version of the Civilizing Argument? Perhaps,
but only a somewhat muted and contested one, appearing indirectly, for
example, in recent historians' debates about whether capitalist growth advanced or impeded the global antislavery movement of the nineteenth century. 136 If there is a modem version, it may be best represented in

literature. Here the commercial, property-pursuing person has been the
subject of a number of fictional personifications as a moral type: George
Babbitt, 3 7 Sammy Glick,' 38 Rabbit Angstrom,' 3 9 Scrooge McDuck."' 0
These fictional characters are not entirely admirable types, but on the
whole they are not so terrible either. They share with Tocqueville's Americans the tendency to an unfulfilled restlessness, but also, to a greater or
lesser extent, most also share the Tocquevillian Americans' sociability, egalitarianism, pragmatism-and their platitudes as well. Taken together, they
are of a type that I have described elsewhere not as Athenian, and certainly
4
not Spartan, but rather Babylonian.1 1
The newly transformed republics of the post-socialist age are another
intriguing modem showcase for the relationship between capitalism and
what Tocqueville might have called morals or moeurs. Small facts about
these countries tell volumes: some sales clerks have to be taught to smile at
the newly-opened McDonalds; 42 others have to learn to pay attention to
customers rather than lounging around and insulting them; 43 new businesses have to learn that they cannot bait and switch the same partners
132 2 id at 185-86; it. at 175-77. Tocqueville makes a similar point but notes that the great
exception was the indifference to slaves, which negatively illustrated his view that sympathy is
related to equality of social condition.
133 1 id- at 70, 308-09; 2 id at 270.
134 1 id at 198-99; 2 id at 114-15, 117-18, 126-27.
135 In contrast to what he saw as the Americans' practical good sense, Tocqueville disparaged
some of their qualities of mind; he thought Americans were unusually likely to have vastly generalized and uncreative ideas (2 id. at 14-18, 274-77), phantasmagoric religious notions (2 id. at 75,
82, 142-43), and, due to their inability to notice fine and precise detail, precious little poetic or
literary refinement (2 id. at 62, 75, 82). The famous tyranny of the majority had an effect too,
intimidating those who had novel thoughts. 1 iat at 273-74.
136 See supranotes 127-28.
137 SINCLAIR LEwIs, BABBrr (1922).
138 BUDD SCHULBERG, WHAT MAKES SAMMY RUN? (1941).
139 JOHN UpDiKE, RABBIT, RUN (1960), and perhaps even more, RABBIT IS RICH (1981).
140 For an extensive description of this Disney character, Donald Duck's fabulously wealthy
capitalist uncle, see JEFF RovIN, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CARTOON ANiMALS 235-37

(1991).
141 Rose, supra note 50, at 105.
142 Adi Ignatius, Russians Who WearJungle Ties or-Spit Need Not Apply, WALL ST. J.,June 9, 1992,
at Al (describing re-education needed for employees).
143 See Seth Faison, Service With Some Bile, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 22, 1995, § 4, at 4 (describing efforts
to correct atrocious service by Chinese store clerks, attributed to the legacy of Communist rule;
officials have banned fifty rude remarks by clerks, including: "Who told you not to look where
you're going?. . .. Didn't you hear me, what do you have ears for? .

.

. Are you finished talk-
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twice.'4 These events suggest that capitalist property has a kind of moral
and cultural infrastructure that we may have mistakenly thought was simply
natural, whereas in fact it is learned through sustained commercial practice, and lost when those practices deteriorate. 145 The content of this infrastructure includes the attitudes that Tocqueville noticed: confidence about
one's ability to get things done, either individually or by joining with
others; and accompanying that confidence, a certain absence of covetousness even amidst the mad scramble for more material things. 46 In the
commercial society, well-being is not a zero-sum game, and apparently the
citizenry is aware of that fact.
But how successful is this property-pursuing moral type in attending to
other kinds of rights, and in shielding those from depredation? In the
America that Tocqueville saw, property did appear to be a kind of school
for self-restraint, perhaps most strikingly evident in the annals of the migrant trails west across the continent, where even the most desperate travellers showed a mind-boggling respect for the property of others. 147 Indeed,
the Americans' dealings with property and commerce must have borne a
striking resemblance to the "self-interest rightly understood" that Tocqueville found so impressive in American political life. 148
But Tocqueville himself was famously pessimistic about the Americans'
ability to respect rights and liberties beyond property, due to their egalitarian propensity to give in to majority opinion.' 49 Whatever Tocqueville
thought of the "gentle commerce" thesis' 50 -or of the evidence that commerce could inculcate confidence, cooperativeness, or respect for otherswhen he discussed institutions that might dam the egalitarian floodwaters
of majoritarianism, he focused on local government, voluntary associations
ing? ... Why didn't you choose well when you bought it?... Stop shouting. Can't you see I'm
eating?... Now you tell me. What have you been doing all this time?").
144 See, e.g, Marshall I. Goldman, Do Business in Russia? ForNow, No, N.Y. TMEs, Aug. 7,1994,
§ 3, at 9 (describing cavalier contract-breaking by Russian firms, among other problems; advising
foreign firms to stay away).
145 For the development of commercial trust, see Kollock, supranote 128, at 338-41; Charles F.
Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Co-operation in a Volatile Economy, in INDusTRtAL DisTRICTS AND LocAL ECONOMIC REGENERATION 215, 229-30 (Frank Pike & Werner Sengenberger
eds., 1992) (describing economic development project in Pennsylvania). For an example of the
loss of respect for property and the related ethical damage, see Amy Barrett, From Thefts of Art to
Toilet Paper, Czechoslovakia Crime Wave Spreads, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1992, at A10C (describing
growth of theft and resultant need for security and ethical education). See atsoJustice Marshall's
opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 354-55 (1827) (describing the importance of the
Contracts Clause for avoiding measures that impair commerce while destroying trust and
"sap[ping] the morals of the people").
146 2 TOCQuEvILLE, supranote 129, at 136-38 (noting that the American poor anticipate attaining the "good things" of the wealthy).
147 JOHN P-ILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL 350-55 (1980) (describing punctilious respect for property rights in conditions of
starvation, thirst, and other great distress on Overland Trail).
148 2 TocovumL.E, supra note 129, at 129-32.
149 1 id. at 264-80.
150 As a reader of Montesquieu, Tocqueville probably knew about this thesis, although he did
not pick up much on Montesquieu's analysis of the place of commerce in democracies. For
Tocqueville's relation to Montesquieu, see Melvin Richter, The Uses of Theory: Tocqueville's Adaptation of Montesquieu, in ESSAys nN THEORY AND HISTORy 74, 95 (Melvin Richter ed., 1970).
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and the legal profession, far more than on property and commerce. 15 ' Indeed, he often appeared to think that commercial pursuits were part and
parcel of American egalitarianism and striving. Commerce seemed clearly
as vulgar as those other egalitarian traits, and possibly even subtly danger15 2
ous to liberty.
Tocqueville's picture certainly leaves some ambiguity about whether
the pursuit of property makes people more civil, and hence more capable
of supporting and respecting rights generally. The haunting fear is that
commerce and property may indeed have these civilizing qualities to some
degree, but that they remain vulnerable to the sudden, irresistible blows of
envy and majoritarian passions.
A similar specter haunts the next argument.
VI.

THE DISTRACTION ARGUMENT

Property protects all other rights because the pursuit of property makes politics seem boring.

The essence of the Distraction Argument is that the pursuit of property can open up competing attractions to passion-driven political feuds,
and thus safeguard all the other rights. Why muck about in politics to try to
destroy the rights of others, when money-making and business are so vastly
more exciting?
Like the Civilizing Argument, the Distraction Argument is probably
most important in its historical form. Among their predictions for an
American commercial republic, the great Federalist founders apparently
included a hope that market enterprise, in a unified commercial republic,
could divert the citizenry from the great man-made scourges of Europethe political rivalries over honor, prestige, and place, the horrors of reli153
gious and sectarian conflict, the devastating carnage of class war.
In the founding period, some of that carnage was about as close in

time as our own Civil War is to us. The mid-seventeenth century civil wars
in England, with their heavy religious overtones, and the hideous destruction of the Thirty Years' War in Germany, ending only in 1648-those were
events well within historical recall in late eighteenth century America.
151

1 TOCQUF.ILLE, supra note 129, at 202 (associations), 282-90 (legal profession); for other

institutions counteracting majoritarianism, see 1 id. at 281-82 (local government), 291-97 (jury
trial). He did evidently think commerce important to the development of a taste for liberty,
however, and said so in some fragments; see Richter, supra note 150, at 99-100 (citing Tocqueville,
Sur la D~mocratie en Am~rique, (Fragments in~dits), intro. byJ. P. Mayer, La Nouvelle Revue
Francaise 7 (1959)).
152 This is particularly notable in the later-written second volume of DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
where he suggested that material pursuits can isolate individuals, presumably making them more
vulnerable to majoritarianism. See, e.g., 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 129, at 149-51 (suggesting that
the quest for material well-being can make citizens withdraw from politics, opening the door to
dictators); 2 id. at 163-65 (suggesting that the pursuit of wealth diverts Americans from political
activity). See also 2 id at 168-71 (suggesting that over time, manufacturing could bring a new
aristocracy by degrading workers and opening the social gulf between the wealthy and workers).
153 Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 631, 648-49 (Leo
Strauss &Joseph Cropsey eds., 2d ed. 1972) (emphasizing the role of commerce in reducing class
conflict).
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They certainly had a place in the Federalist Papers, most famously in The
FederalistNo. 10.154

Commercial enterprise, along with a careful structuring of the representative body, might help to offer a way out. If the acquisition of property
could be divorced from personal status, and if trade could be opened up
throughout a huge market, then everyone could aspire to make money and
get rich. And that prospect would seem far more tempting, far more interesting than an endless round of zero-sum rivalries over political controlrivalries fueled by factional strivings, fears, and oppressions. Whatever Tocqueville's attitudes on commerce, his observations on the Americans' allconsuming commercialism suggested that, a half-century later, the Distrac55
tion Argument might well be working.
No doubt commerce does have the effect of diverting attention from
political rivalries. Part of the reason, of course, is that commerce can make
a country wealthier, and if there is more to go around, there is less reason
to bicker over the scraps. But more importantly, an open economy makes
bickering over scraps look tedious and silly.
But having said all that, the Distraction Argument is certainly not perfect, at least not all the time, and it is modem experience that especially
sharpens this point. While the prospect of property and a market economy
can distract people from politics and feuds, the events of the former Yugoslavia and post-colonial Africa suggest the converse is true too-that politics and feuds can distract people from property and a market economy.
Commerce, trade and the pursuit of property are certainly interesting activities, but on the whole, they can only sustain their interest where a society
already has a stable culture of property, where property already is secure.
The Distraction Argument has an unfortunate element of circularity: Property and commerce only distract from politics in a political order that has
determined that property and commerce are important, and that is capable of assuring the citizenry that it will make good on that determination. 56 This is no doubt one reason why it is difficult to establish fullfledged free market regimes in places with little history of protecting
property.
Like the other arguments for property's centrality, then, the Distraction Argument has a certain ambiguity. What is left, then, is an Argument
that brings us full circle, back to the outset and to the lowly "merely economic" arguments for property.

154 THE FEDERAuST No. 10 (James Madison) (citing as a cause of faction the "zeal for different
opinions concerning religion"); see also THE FEDERAuST No. 19 (Alexander Hamilton &James
Madison) (referring to the devastation of the ThirtyYears' War); THE FEDERAuST No. 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that freedom of religion depends on the number of sects).
155 See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., Ignatius, supranote 13, at Al (budding entrepreneur concerned about political
extortion, feels need to make political alliances); Howard W. French, NigeriansLament "Locusts"
ThatPick Nation Bare, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 12, 1995, atA4 (attributing growth of scam artists in Nigeria to ethos of government corruption; suggesting that energies are directed not at production
but at control of government).
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THE LUXURY-GOOD ARGUMENT

Propertyprotects all other rightsprecisely by fulfilling its economicfunction,
and by making a society wealthier.
This Argument builds directly on the Benthamite understanding of
property's economic role: property encourages industry, investment, prudence, and trade, all of which make the society better off. In turn, greater
wealth means not only that the citizens can do more things for themselves
individually, but that they can also do more collectively. Governments in
wealthier societies can use some portion of the citizenry's wealth for common enterprises-roads, parks, health, environmental protection, and
even welfare. Finally, because they are wealthier, the citizens are happier,
and hence more tolerant of each other-and more willing to acknowledge
one anothers' rights.
The absence of prosperity, on the other hand, can induce citizens to
undertake dangerous experiments. This is often said of the Weimar era in
Germany, where a period of rampant inflation was followed by the economic collapse of the early Depression years, and where citizens began to
take the National Socialists seriously, with all their crazy and murderous
plans. 15 7 It has been said more recently about parts of what used to be the
Soviet Union, where the snail's pace of economic development seems to
make neo-Fascist politicians more attractive. 158
The argument here, then, is that most liberties are luxury goods-they
follow after wealth is secured. On this argument, property and the resultant prosperity may not be sufficient for the enjoyment of liberties, but they
are certainly necessary, without property and prosperity, other rights are in
danger. 5 9 Thus of all the arguments for property's keystone role, the
Luxury-Good Argument most directly builds on property's "merely economic" features.
Nevertheless, the Luxury-Good Argument is faced with an historical
critique tracing back at least to Montesquieu. This riposte suggests that
liberty is, if anything, less likely to be a luxury good than a poverty good.
Montesquieu thought that the real glue of democratic government is the
virtue and patriotism of the citizenry; 60 this is because republican government dispenses with hierarchical rule and instead demands great self-restraint in the citizenry itself.16' But he also argued that republican virtue
cannot easily bear great disparities of wealth, because republican spirit gen157 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. HUGHES, PAYING FOR THE GERMAN INFLATION 185-87 (1988). But see
RicHARD F. HAMILTON, WHO VOTED FOR HITLER? 9-10, 228, 458-61 (1982) (disputing the common
thesis that the lower-middle class supported Hitler; finding more evidence of support in the
threatened upper and upper-middle classes).
158 See, e.g., Stephen Kinzer, FretfulLatvians Turn to German With a Racist Past, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 1995, at A13 (citing argument that lack of economic progress can cause "explosive" frustradons leading citizens to support a rightist).
159 See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Force is Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 44,
49 (stating that Chile seems to be safe from a new military coup as long as the country's economy
is prospering).
160 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 87, at 24-27.
161 1 id. at 24.

1996]

PROPERTY AS THE KEYSTONE RIGHT?

erally requires equality and a "mediocrity" of fortunes. 162 While he conceded that citizens of democracies might engage in commerce and even
amass great wealth, the reason-a variant on the Civilizing Argument-was
63
that commercial activity fostered frugality, prudence, and orderliness.
To maintain those virtues, commercial actors had to stay hungry, as it were;
hence Montesquieu suggested that democracies might best subject wealth
to various devices for more equal division.' 64 Otherwise commerce might
give rise to the inequalities in which "particular passions" 165 and corruption
fester, while republican virtue collapses along with republican government
itself.
A trace of this Argument resurfaced in some of the Anti-Federalist attacks on the Federalist Constitution. While clearly approving the security
of property and even the benefits of commerce, 66 the Anti-Federalists were
concerned about potential inequalities and their effects on the polity. An
important Anti-Federalist tract, the "Letters from The Federal Farmer,"
commented that:
If there are advantages in the equal division of our lands, and the strong
and manly habits of our people, we ought to establish governments calculated to give duration to them, and not governments which never can
work naturally, till that equality67 of property, and those free and many
habits shall be destroyed ....

1

Notice that the Poverty-Good riposte does not directly contradict the
Luxury-Good Argument, and indeed the two share a critical element: both
tend to stress that there must be some relatively smooth curve in the distribution of wealth. Even on the pure Luxury-Good Argument, citizens
threatened by impoverishment will not be soothed to learn that some of
168
their fellow citizens are filthy rich. Quite the contrary.
The Poverty-Good caveat thus brings to light a crucial issue for the
Luxury-Good Argument: whether some rough equality or at least some
smooth curve of wealth distribution does indeed thrive in a market economy-the rising tide lifts all boats, as the saying goes. 169 That is of course
the promise of the economic argument for property: property and commerce create wealth for all as a positive sum, rather than passing it around
in a zero-sum game. And to some considerable degree, the historical record seems to support the "rising tide" view, that is, developed commercial
162 1 id at 50-51.
163 1 iL at 56-57.
164 1 id. at 54-57. He suggested periodic redistribution of lands, the regulation of dowries,
taxation on the wealthy, and division of inherited wealth. Failing those possibilities, he suggested
what seemed to be a more serious policing of morals through boards of censors and strict paternal authority. I id. at 57-60.
165 1 id. at 50.
166 See Rose, supra note 50, at 92-93.
167 ObservationsLeading to a FairExaminationof the System of Government Proposedby the Late Convention, Lettersfrom the FederalFarmer,in 2 THE CoMPLETE ANi-FEDERAuST, supra note 51, at 251.
168 See Kinzer, supra note 158.
169 See John C. Weicher, PrivateProduction: Has the Rising Tide Lifted All Boats?, in HOUSING
AMERIcA's POOR 45 (Peter D. Salins ed., 1987) (arguing that an increase in overall housing quantity raises housing quality even among the poor).
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societies are more likely to show a flourishing middle class, less dramatic
extremes of wealth and poverty, greater opportunities for historically dependent categories of people, including women, and-not least-some no170
ticeable apparatus for welfare.
The grim news is that if this optimistic expectation is mistaken, and if
the security of property and commerce do yield harshly visible inequalities
that transform civic self-restraint into envy and rage on the one side, and
contempt and corruption on the other, then the security of property is at
risk along with all the prosperity it brings, and all the liberty it safeguards. 17 1 And in our own times, we clearly have some anxiety that capitalist wealth can corrode equality and civility. One sign is the persistence of
the argument for redistribution as a "big bribe" to prevent social upheavals. 172 Another sign is the elaboration of "indexes of inequality," which
173
social scientists and policy-makers clearly think is a matter of concern.
Indeed, earlier commercial republics may have been nervous about the social consequences of wealth disparities as well. Their characteristic symptoms appeared in their own extensive institutions for charity, 174 and
perhaps also in the multilayered sumptuary laws that attempted (often futilely) to restrain the peacocks of the town from lording it over their less
fortunate fellow citizens. 175 Seen in their most cynical light, then, redistri170 For the relative freedom of women in the Dutch Republic, see SIMON SCHAMA, EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES 402-07 (1988). For the notable charitable institutions of commercial republics,
see id. at 575-79 (describing extensive poor relief in seventeenth century Holland) and K.H.D.
HALEY, THE DUTCH IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 155-59 (1972) (noting same). See also GERALD
STRAUSS, NUREMBERG IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 194-98 (1966) (describing charitable institutions

in a wealthy German commercial center).
171 Variants on this theme have resurfaced often-the wealth of commercial democracies may
undermine the very civic qualities that allow societies to become wealthy-for example, in Max
Weber's observations on puritan religion, and in Schumpeter's gloomy predictions for capitalist
democracy. For these and other variants, see Hirschman, Rival Interpretations,supranote 124, at
1463, 1466-70 (1982). Hirschman, however, does not find these doubts entirely persuasive. Id. at
1468, 1470 (describing planning and welfare state reforms as self-corrections of modem capitalism); id. at 1483 (gentle-commerce thesis and destructive-commerce thesis might both be true
simultaneously).
172 See Frank I. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community Self-Determination: CompetingJudicial
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. LJ. 145, 154 (1978) (describing "big-bribe" as a
rational-actor justification for welfare system); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 423 n.4, 424, 434 (1934) (alluding to breaches of the peace and the need to maintain
orderly government as the rationale for a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law); 81 CONG. REC.
8256 (1937) (reporting debates over the first federal housing statute, the 1937 Housing Act, and
Senator Lee alluding to slums as "a seedbed for radical propaganda" and "spawning grounds of
communism"); cf. EPSTEIN, supranote 3, at 316 (rejecting bribe rationale for welfare).
173 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Widest Gap in Incomes? Research Points to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1995, at D2 (reporting a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
that the income gap between the highest and lowest income segments is greater in the United
States than in other large industrial countries).
174 See supra text accompanying note 170; ScHAMA, supra note 170, at 577 (observing that the
well-to-do Dutch could only feel comfortable with their wealth if it also seemed to enhance the
more general community well-being); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 319. Epstein distinguishes
sharply between charitable giving and legally enforced redistribution, but this distinction may
have less force for societies in which established religion or universal customary norms require
giving.
175 See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 170, at 109-15 (describing strictures on clothing and extravagance in sixteenth century Nuremberg). Strauss thinks these sumptuary laws were motivated by
decorum and morality-, for example, the efforts to allay codpiece stuffing. Id at 113. Strauss also
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bution programs in some ways attest to a collective hedging of bets on the
Luxury-Good Argument.
On the other hand, seen in their best light, redistribution programs
are a recognition of the prerequisites of a democratic commonwealth, and
perhaps of its commercial success as well.' 76 Cass Sunstein regards redistribution as an integral part of mature free market constitutions.

77

If this is

so, the Luxury-Good Argument for property's primacy-taken together
with the Poverty-Good corrective-suggest some reasons why people might
think so. Shifting some wealth to smooth the curve of life prospects is only
one of those reasons. Just as important is the "story" that a society conveys
about itself through such efforts, conveying an attitude of generosity and
concern for fellow citizens, an attitude that in effect glues the whole
178
together.
This is obviously an extremely tricky subject. The Luxury-Good Argument bases itself squarely on the wealth-producing characteristics of property regimes, and the obvious objection to redistribution is that it attacks
property and saps the energy, care, and effort that property promotes; producers may be discouraged, while recipients become opportunistic, and
everyone winds up the poorer. 79 More subtly, if redistributive efforts do
have such unproductive effects, they can also breed resentment and cynicism, which in turn corrode the civility and law-abidingness on which commerce depends. Perhaps it was for that reason that historic charitable
institutions took serious (and to a modern eye rather unattractive) precautions against free-riding. 8 0
Does wealth itself, then, promote a kind of stability in which other
rights may flourish? Many have thought so-even Aristotle may have
thought so" 81-but over a very long time, no one has seemed completely
confident, at least not without conscious effort to adjust for the material
and moral consequences of inequality. The Luxury-Good Argument
quickly leads to the question of redistribution, and on that issue, the Argument walks a tightrope-perhaps "damned if you do," but perhaps also
"damned if you don't."
thinks that these laws retained class distinctions, but he notes that they did fall more heavily on
the wealthy. Id. at 112, 114.
176 Hirschman, supra note 124, at 1470 (describing welfare state as a modification that sustains
capitalism).
177 Sunstein, supra note 101, at 917.
178 Cf.Lawrence Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJusticeor Economic Efficiency, 98 HARv.L.
R-v.592, 595-98 (1985) (criticizing the sole focus on efficiency in judicial decisions, arguing that
these decisions tell a "constitutive" story about the society in which we live).
179 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 320-22. For an interesting variant, see Howard W.
French, Does Sharing Wealth Only Promote Poverty?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1995, at A4 (describing the
strong norm of sharing with one's family in Ivory Coast, which discourages individuals from accumulating savings or investing more in business).
180 The seventeenth century Dutch not only expected recipients of charity to behave gratefully and respectably, but they also banned orjailed vagabonds who were thought to be incapable
of adopting community values. See ScHAmA,supra note 170, at 579-83.
181 THE PoLrIcs oF AmIsToTs= 181-83 (Ernest Barker ed., 1962) (suggesting that democracies
work best when there is a large middle class, rather than extremes of wealth and poverty, which
cause dissension and diminish "friendship"). Parts of this passage, incidentally, are remarkably
similar to Madison's FEDERALIST No. 10.
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CONCLUSION

Those, then, are seven arguments (with many permutations) why the
right to property is not simply important but rather the most important right
in a liberal constitutional order. The mere fact that many of these arguments are very old does not mean that they are trivial or false; even trite
points can be true. And the fact that they are contested does not mean
that they are false either; some may be more persuasive than their would-be
rebuttals. This long-standing contestability only means that over a quite
protracted period, the arguments for property's political centrality-its
guardianship role over other rights-have not proved to be completely
convincing to those concerned with constitutional ordering.
We know this in another way, too. If we really thought that property
was the "guardian of every other right," we would not be so concerned to
safeguard all those other rights independently. Protecting property would
be enough, and the other protections of rights would be mere redundancy.
Instead, to the great chagrin of some property rights champions, 8 2 property is only somewhat ambiguously protected in our constitutional law-as
is witnessed by the legendary inconclusiveness of Takings Clause interpretation-while other rights seem considerably more firmly established as a
legal and constitutional matter. 8 3
Thus these seven arguments, with all their caveats, leave some questions. First, in the light of all these doubts, why are the arguments for
property's keystone role so persistent? And second, in the light of this persistence, why are these arguments nevertheless so fragile and subject to
doubt?
As to the question of persistence of these arguments, one might
surmise in the first instance that there is a combination of two simple factors: first, the arguments themselves are at least partially persuasive, even if
not rising to the Q.E.D. level; and second, the question of property's primacy really does matter. There are many parts of the world in which no
rights are firmly established, and yet there is at least a plausible case-or
rather several plausible cases-that the security of property can set the
stage for more thoroughgoing protections of other rights.
It is not easy to say this about any other right. Consider the right to
vote, or to speak freely-rights that could easily be cited as the most important among the political rights.' 8 4 How far would they be likely to carry a
citizenry whose property is at risk? What boldness, independence and crea182 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 20, at 132-34 (complaining of the constitutional neglect of property rights since the 1930s); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause is
Neither Weak Nor Obtuse 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1630, 1634-36, 1666 (1988) (noting the instability of
Takings Clause interpretation but arguing for core meaning).
183 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937) described a constitutional practice in which property
and economic rights are taken to be less important than those that protect the political process
or guard against oppression of minorities).
184 See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics,90 COLUM. L. Rav. 979,
980, 983-85 (1990) (citing free speech as an especially important right because it preserves autonomy, checks governmental abuses, advances access to truth, and especially creates an attitude of
tolerance and self-restraint).
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tivity are to be expected without the backstop of some security of property?
Some, to be sure. But how much, among how many people?
Perhaps just as important a factor in the ever-renewed hopes for property as a keystone right, the institution of property itself is extremely persistent. Virtually all peoples of whom we have any knowledge have invented
property regimes for themselves in order to manage the resources they find
important. 8 5 People have created property even in the face of proscriptions against property-holding, as witnessed by the pervasive blackmarketeering that occurs in centrally-organized economies.1 8 6 Indeed,
centralized economies have to expend much effort to stamp out the ever87
sprouting mushrooms of informal or illegal property.
Property, then, seems so hardy a weed that its protection can be had
on the cheap, as it were, and thus property seems especially attractive as a
vehicle to carry other rights. Having already become wealthy, we in the
West can enjoy the luxury of redundant protection of rights here at home,
but in a world of scarce resources and conflicting priorities, where people
may be able to bet only on one pony, property may look like the strongest
horse.
But what about the continued doubts about these arguments for property's keystone role? Paradoxically, the fragility of the arguments may arise
because property itself is fragile-much more so than one would think
from its sheer persistence. A central feature of this fragility is this: property entails the cooperation of others. You cannot have property all alone.
Even the rule of First Possession, seemingly so quintessentially individualistic, depends on the recognition and acquiescence of others; they must
know what you are claiming, and tacitly agree to let you hold it-even
88
against their own interests.
A property regime thus depends on a great deal of cooperation, trustworthiness, and self-restraint among the people who enjoy it; but unfortunately, the origins of those qualities are not entirely clear. Theoretical
rational-actor models struggle to find some basis upon which individuals
cooperate and recognize entitlements in others, instead of generally following the zero-sum strategies of brawling, thieving, and defrauding. 8 9 Moving from theory to practice, we know that in fact, small and close-knit
185 See, e.g., Martinj. Bailey, Approximate Optimality ofAboriginalProperty Rights, 35J.L. & ECON.
183, 189-94 (1992) (citing examples of varying types of property rights among different aboriginal groups); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern
Kwakiutl Indians,15J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 60-61 (1986) (describing property rights in various groups
as an aspect of producing wealth).
186 See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 77, at 409, and sources cited therein (describing a "shadow"
economy in Soviet Russia).
187 Judith L. Anderson, ChangingConceptions of Economic Crime under Russian Law, 14 WHrrIER
L. REv. 451, 452 (1993) (stating that economic crimes were estimated at one-third of all convictions and incarcerations in Soviet Union); id. at 455 (describing Soviet-era economic criminalization of private entrepreneurial activity).
188 See Carol M. Rose, 'Enough and As Good" of What?, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 417, 438-39 (1987)
(describing claims of possession as depending on those who recognize claims, even against own
immediate interest).
189 For a critique of the large body of scholarship that assumes away the problem, see James
Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 325, 332-39, 339 n.44
(1992). See alsoJON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SocIET. A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 203 (1989)
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groups regularly succeed in establishing property regimes among themselves, 190 but the small size of such groups may dramatically limit their ability to produce commercial wealth; the opportunities for trade and
specialization are simply too restricted.
In a larger arena, where property combines with far-flung commerce
to produce genuine wealth, property is much more vulnerable. There, insofar as the institution of property helps people to become wealthier, it
invites predators. John Locke knew this when he spoke of the "inconveniencies" of having to guard one's property from the forceful depredations of others. The ancient Norsemen knew it too, when they cruised
about, looking for wealthy towns to sack. Modern scam artists know it just
as well, when they concoct elaborate dramas to dupe their victims through
an uncanny mimicry of ordinary business dealings. 19 1
Property, in short, is a risky business. It is a persistent institution, to be
sure, but a fragile one too-and most fragile precisely in those contexts
where it can produce the greatest wealth. That may be a good reason why
we follow a mixed strategy about rights and take a guarded approach to
property as a keystone right. Perhaps property could protect other rights
by its own force if only it were easy to safeguard; but instead, property is itself a
delicate institution.
Still, property does bounce back constantly, in spite of the jolts it takes
from predation. Why? The answer might lie in whatever truth there is in
the Civilizing Argument. That is, property regimes may tend to regenerate
endogenously, as it were, because given the slightest elbow room, they induce the very qualities of cooperation, attentiveness to others, responsibility, and self-restraint that themselves are the prerequisites to the successful
handling and trade of property. In societies where people can cultivate
those traits, property regimes generally reward them in a very simple way:
the societies get richer. It should be noted that when property rewards
cooperative traits, it also rewards the very qualities of "self-interest rightly
understood" that helps democratic government to function. And the depredations to property are educational too, if only in a cautionary way; a few
of the strong may become very much wealthier, but only temporarily, because everyone else becomes very much poorer.
All this suggests at most a rather modest claim for property as a keystone right, that is, as an educative institution. On that conception, property would play a central role not as the fierce bulldog guardian of
autonomous individual rights, but rather as the gentle and somewhat fragile persuader, rewarding the character traits needed not only for commerce but also for self-government.
(suggesting that noncooperation is the dominant strategy of outcome-oriented rational
individuals).
190 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw 167, 185-89 (1991) (hypothesizing that closeknit groups establish wealth-maximizing norms, and giving two property examples in trespass and
fencing rules); see also Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1320 (similar hypothesis with respect to norms
of landed property).
191 For the analysis of scams as dramas mimicking ordinary commerce, see ARTHUR LEFF, SWiNDING AND SELLING 28-29, 51 (1976).
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The rhetoric of property often seems to resound with the notes of heroic autonomy-"I can do what I please with my property"-perhaps, as
noted earlier, in the same way that we so often symbolize property by easilysegregated land rather than flowing and necessarily-shared water.19 2 But
such heroic rhetoric rests on the quite mistaken notion that this most intensely social of institutions hinges on individualism alone, whereas in fact
it thoroughly mixes independence and cooperation. Indeed, taken to an
extreme, the in-your-face rhetoric of property rights can undermine actual
institutions of property, suggesting that anything goes, and that the property owner need not care in the least for his fellows. That is not what
makes property work to make a society richer. And it is not what makes
democracy work to make a society freer. If property has a claim to a role as
a keystone right, it is because those two facts are related, and because learning one may help in learning the other.

192 On water, see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. For some examples of ordinary
conceptions of property, see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GEmNG EvEN: LEGAL
CONSciousNEss AMONG WORKING-CLAss AmvUCANS 41-47 (1990).
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